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Abstract
Water is vital for supporting life and welfare. Worldwide, water
resources are under high pressure and freshwater ecosystems have been
degraded and even lost. These pressures are likely to be aggravated by
climate change. To tackle ecosystem service degradation and loss, Payment
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for Ecosystem Services (“PES”) arose in the environmental policy arena to
address positive externalities, using a “carrot” rather than a “stick.”
Nevertheless, much confusion remains regarding its concept and
application since the theory has been built based upon different site-specific
schemes applied throughout the world. This paper seeks to provide an
overview of the key elements that characterize the theory of payments for
ecosystem services, translated to watershed protection. It also aims to
explore under which general situations the use of this policy is appropriate,
as well as its potentials and constraints.
The research was based on an extensive review of the existing
literature on PES that analyzes payment schemes in detail, in both
developed and developing countries. The conclusions indicate that PES
entails hard tradeoffs and is appropriate for a limited set of conditions.
Despite being limited in scope, PES can effectively fill the gaps where other
policies are failing. Overall, PES is gaining momentum not because it is a
catchphrase but because there is a real need for better ecosystem service
management.

I. Introduction
Life on Earth was formed and developed in water. Civilizations have
developed near rivers and lakes throughout human history, and have relied
on benefits provided by freshwater ecosystems in order to achieve economic
development and welfare. Drinking water is essential for the survival of
humans and animals, as well as for the process of photosynthesis, thereby
making primary production possible and supporting the whole food chain.
Water also drives economic and social development since it is essential for
food production and required in the commercial and industrial sector.
Additionally, it is necessary for many forms of energy production, ranging
from hydro power to cooling thermal systems and nuclear power stations.
Aquatic ecosystems sustain fisheries and provide raw material for
pharmaceutical products and bioengineering. Freshwater ecosystems also
provide nonmaterial benefits such as cultural, artistic, spiritual, recreational,
and aesthetic services.
However, humans are not the only “consumers” of water and other
freshwater ecosystem benefits. Nature is possibly the most important and
voiceless user, as it depends upon water and well-running aquatic
ecosystems in order to support services that deliver these benefits that are
crucial for maintaining life and welfare. Once the needs of a natural
ecosystem are met, freshwater ecosystems provide a wide range of
ecosystem services such as climate and hydrological regulation, nutrient
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distribution and primary production, sheltering, breeding and habitat for
several species, waste dilution and detoxification, and mitigation of natural
hazards, as well as some commodities referred to previously. To achieve
these ends, both water quantity and quality are important because they are
intricately related factors in the overall functioning of freshwater systems.
As a result, adequate water supply underpins life and health and is
fundamental for the maintenance of the whole ecosystem.
Despite the significance and value of these benefits, in the past few
decades water resources have been under high pressure, and freshwater
ecosystems are among the most degraded — many have even been lost, as
demonstrated by several assessment reports conducted on this topic.2
Exponential human population growth, excessive patterns of consumption,
economic development, and myopic views about the limits of natural capital
are direct and indirect drivers of ecosystem degradation and loss, which are
exacerbated by climate change. The rate and extent to which ecosystems
have been affected indicates that a new approach to the way we manage
them is urgently required.
The problem is aggravated by the inherent complexity of the subject,
our limited knowledge of the dynamics between ecosystem structures and
functions, our undervaluation of these services, and the nature of public
goods of most ecosystem services. Although our understanding of
ecosystem links has dramatically improved in the last fourty years, there is
still a long way to go. Ecosystem services, other than commodities, are still
undervalued in our economy and policymaking. When these services are not
assessed and valued, there are few chances that they will play a significant
role, if any, in decisionmaking. Without this information, we are likely to
continue making choices and tradeoffs myopically based solely on
immediate human needs. Finally, the inherent characteristics of public
goods of most ecosystem services subject them to both over-consumption
and under-production.
To cope with such a complex problem, we need to adopt complex
solutions which usually involve several approaches. The traditional toolbox
of policies applied for environmental protection range from traditional
command and control to economic incentives. As they are being tested in
empirical situations, scholars have presented their advantages and

2. See e.g., ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: CURRENT STATE AND TRENDS,
VOLUME 1 (Rashid Hassan et al., eds., Island Press 2005); WATER IN A CHANGING WORLD
(The United Nations World Water Development Report 3, 2009), available at
http://www.unesco.org/water/wwap/wwdr/wwdr3/pdf/WWDR3_Water_in_a_Changing_
World.pdf.
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disadvantages, as well as presenting educated opinions as to under which
situations each policy is more appropriate. In the 1980s, Payments for
Ecosystem Services (“PES”) emerged in the forefront as the newest
conservation policy tool. This tool was designed to address the case of
under valuation of ecosystem services. As a result, this policy relies strongly
on positive incentives represented by a carrot rather than a stick.
Initially received as a win-win solution to achieve sustainable
development and environmental protection, PES is a policy that, instead,
recognizes hard trade-offs. Because this approach is new and its theory has
been built using several different schemes that are currently being tested
around the world much confusion remains regarding the concept and
application of this policy. There is no agreement in the literature regarding
the concept of ecosystem services.3 Nevertheless, based on the description
of its key elements, it is possible to draw conclusions and place this policy
in a distinctive and unique position in the policy podium. This paper seeks
to provide an overview of the key elements that characterize the theory of
payments for ecosystem services, translated to watershed protection. It also
aims to appropriate situations for its application, as well as its potentials
and constraints.
The research was based on an extensive review of the existing
literature on PES that thoughtfully analyzes payment schemes in both
developed and developing countries.
Notwithstanding that service
characteristics are site specific and that institutional arrangements vary
among countries, some key elements must be in place in order to identify
the policy and ensure its effectiveness. The situations in which this policy is
appropriate are also common throughout the various approaches. This
framework is valuable for policy makers aiming to introduce payment
schemes to protect or enhance freshwater ecosystem service provisions,
particularly in Brazil, which recently introduced a bill in Congress to regulate
payments for ecosystem services4 and is already testing some pilot projects
for watershed protection.5

3. See different conceptualizations presented in Chapter 8.
4. PL n. 792 of 2007, http://www.camara.gov.br/sileg/integras/453221.pdf (last
visited Dec. 16, 2010).
5. Currently, there are several pilot projects for watershed protection being
tesed in different states of Brazil. They are being implemented according to the
framework of “Produtores de Água” Program, established by Agencia Nacional de
Aguas (“ANA”), a federal governmental agency in charge of managing water
resources. See http://www.ana.gov.br/produagua/.
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This paper is organized in two parts. The first part consists of three
sections. Sections A and B describe ecosystems and their complexities,
providing an overview of how the expression “ecosystem services” was
coined. In Section C the focus narrows down to water resources and
freshwater ecosystem services, providing data and examples according to
the four categories of services adopted in the Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment: provisioning, regulating, cultural, and supporting services. This
chapter ends with an outline of the drivers of change imposing pressures on
ecosystem services.
The second part begins with an analysis of the challenges in designing
policies for environmental protection, investigating how the inherent
complexity of ecosystems and the concepts of public goods and externalities
translate to policy design, the difficulties of ecosystem services economic
valuation, and the different methods currently available). These concepts
set the stage to explore the toolkit of policies available for environmental
protection and PES, particularly Payments for Watershed Services (“PWS”).
This paper intends to address the following issues: how payments for
ecosystem services fit within the policy toolkit; what are the basic features of
payments for ecosystem services; under which circumstances are they
appropriate; and what are the possibilities and caveats. Section D provides
a historical analysis of the onset of this policy, while section E provides a
conceptual definition and classification. Section F investigates, in detail,
each element that is crucial for the definition and identification of this
approach as a new policy tool. Section G explores the fundamental role of
law in the effectiveness of this policy. Section H examines the general
conditions under which payments for ecosystem services are appropriate
and concludes by exploring the potentials and trade-offs involved.

II. Ecosystem Services
A. Ecosystems and Their Interactions
It is appropriate to begin explaining what “ecosystem services” denote
by addressing what ecosystems are. In simple terms, ecosystems are
systems of living organisms, their physical environment and their
interactions.6 All living organisms interact and depend on each other, and
these interactions make energy flows and matter cycles throughout all four
natural spheres — troposphere, atmosphere, hydrosphere and biosphere.

6. JOHN C. NAGLE & J. B. RUHL, THE LAW
MANAGEMENT 318 (Foundation Press 2006).

OF

BIODIVERSITY

AND

ECOSYSTEM
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The expression “ecosystem” was coined in 1935 by the British ecologist
George Tansley (1871-1955) and is used to describe either a distinct
geographic unit of nature, such as a watershed or a forest; a functional unit,
such as nitrogen cycling; or a management unit like a national park.7
Adopting the concept described above, an ecosystem may be explained as
ranging from a drop of water to the entire biosphere.8 Conceived as physical
entities, the geography of ecosystems does not always correspond to the
way in which the political and social landscape is divided9 and does not
always have precise boundaries that determine where one ecosystem ends
and another begins.10 Furthermore, ecosystems are referred to as examples
of “complex adaptive systems,” which means in a state of constant
disequilibrium.11, 12 Given these challenges the law and policy of ecosystem
management requires the adoption of parameters and metrics to identify
what is being studied and managed. To solve the problem of imprecise
boundaries the most promising method adopts certain key factors that
strongly influence ecological processes known as “controlling factors.”13 For
the management to be effective both the metrics and the approach must be
attuned with the policy objectives, and that is when the challenge increases.
In order to best allocate scarce resources among different and competing
needs, policymakers need to make choices based on reliable data;
unfortunately such reliable data is rarely available.
Well functioning ecosystems are directly related to well functioning
biogeochemical cycles. Keeping in mind the open nature of their processes,
the outputs of one ecosystem can be part of the inputs of another
ecosystem. For this system to work correctly, diversity among the organisms
within the biosphere plays a key role.14 Biological diversity, or biodiversity,
refers to the “variability among living organisms from all sources including,
inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological
complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species,

7. John M. Blair et al., Ecosystems as Functional Units in Nature, 14 NAT. RESOURCES
& ENV’T 150 (Winter 2000).
8. NAGLE & RUHL, supra note 6, at 318.
9. Id. at 319.
10. Blair et al., supra note 7, at 151.
11. J.B. RUHL ET AL., THE LAW AND POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES 18 (2007).
12. Under the “new ecology” concept, short-term disturbances and long term
changes drives ecosystems into a complex and dynamic state of adaptation to these
perturbations. See NAGLE & RUHL, supra note 6, at 347.
13. Examples are vegetation, fauna, soil and watershed. See RUHL ET AL., supra
note 11, at 22.
14. NAGLE & RUHL, supra note 6, at 347.
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between species and of ecosystems.”15 Early studies demonstrated that
species diversity is vital in the resilience of ecosystems and directly related
to services provided by nature.16 Resilience is a key property of both social
and ecological systems, because it provides the capacity to absorb change
without losing functions and self-organizing ability for repair, renewal, and
reorganization after the change suffered.17 The rate at which biomass is
produced depends on the diversity of plants in an ecosystem, because that
diversity provides buffers against seasonal and other environmental
changes.18 Continued crop productivity rests on the diversity in crop species
and on the variety of soil invertebrates and microorganisms that maintain
soil fertility.19, 20
Healthy, functioning ecosystems provide several benefits that are
essential to life support and welfare. Life on Earth depends on the
availability of goods and services provided by natural systems, and the
phrase “natural capital” refers to a version of the economic concept of
capital, extended to goods and services provided by those natural systems.21
Natural capital provides all these benefits upon which humanity has relied
and can be viewed “as the sum total of the ecological systems that support
life, different from human-made capital in that natural capital cannot be
produced by human activity.”22 In a broad perspective it means our natural
resources, the four natural spheres and their physical, chemical, and
biological processes. Like traditional capital, natural capital can pay
interest (the services and goods they provide), can depreciate (when the
services delivered are impaired and goods reduced) or can be liquidated
15.
16.

CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, ART. 2 USE OF TERMS (1992).
HAROLD A. MOONEY & PAUL R. EHRLICH, ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: A FRAGMENTARY
HISTORY IN NATURE’S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS 16-17
(Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997).
17. CARL FOLKE ET AL., RESILIENCE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: BUILDING
ADAPTIVE CAPACITY IN A WORLD OF TRANSFORMATIONS (2002), in MALIN FALKENMARK,
FRESHWATER AS SHARED BETWEEN SOCIETY AND ECOSYSTEMS: FROM DIVIDED APPROACHES TO
INTEGRATED CHALLENGES, 358 PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC. LOND. B 2037, 2042 (2003).
18. MICHAEL L. MCKINNEY ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE: SYSTEMS AND SOLUTIONS
82 (4th ed. 2007).
19. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, PERSPECTIVES ON BIODIVERSITY: VALUING ITS ROLE IN
AN EVER-CHANGING WORLD 43 (1999).
20. Diversity is of fundamental importance not only for traditional agriculture
but also provides a valuable resource in gene banks. See Id. at 46.
21. ROBERT COSTANZA ET AL, NATURAL CAPITAL in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EARTH
(2008), available at http://www.eoearth.org/article/Natural_capital.
22. PAUL HAWKEN ET AL., NATURAL CAPITALISM: CREATING THE NEXT INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION 151 (1999).
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(when the resources are depleted and the services no longer exist). As our
understanding about the ecosystem dynamics is still in its infancy, their
economic valuation presents additional challenges that will be explored in
Part II. Let us first analyze the services and goods provided by natural
capital.

B. Ecosystem Services
This rich and complex cycle of life provides several services and goods
for which the relevant literature in its majority, but not uniformly, has
established the phrase “ecosystem services.”23 The services delivered by
ecosystems are essential for the maintenance of life on Earth and are key in
human well-being and economic development. The characteristics and
maintenance of ecosystem services are linked to the diversity of species in
the systems and ultimately to the genetic diversity within those species.24
The recognition of the role played by ecosystems in life support dates
from as early as Plato,25 were explored in George P. Marsh’s Man and Nature,
and were highlighted in the first half of the twentieth century.26 In the
second half of the twentieth century, the International Biological Program
(“IBP”) started developing studies on the productivity of biological
resources, human adaptability to environmental change, and environmental
change itself.27 The studies firmly established ecosystems as an important
unit of study.28 However, it was not until the publication of the Study of
Critical Environmental Problems in 1970 that ecosystem services were so
characterized, listed, and described.29 To the same extent ecosystem

23. See infra note 27. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment adopts the
expression “ecosystem services” while some authors adopts the expression
“environmental services.” However, as Wunder points out, for the purpose of
analyzing the policy of Payment, the substantive difference is minimal. SVEN
WUNDER, CIFOR OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 42: PAYMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES: SOME
NUTS AND BOLTS 4 (2005).
24. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 51.
25. MOONEY & EHRLICH, supra note 16, at 6.
26. Highlighted by: Fairfield Osborn (1948), William Vogt (1948), and Aldo
Leopold (1949). See MOONEY & EHRLICH, supra note 16, at 11–13.
27. See THE INTERNATIONAL BIOLOGICAL PROGRAM, 1964–1974, available at
http://www7.nationalacademies.org/archives/International_Biological_Program.html.
28. MOONEY & EHRLICH, supra note 16, at 14.
29. They were described as: pest control, insect pollination, fisheries, climate
regulation, soil retention, flood control, soil formation, cycling of matter,
composition of the atmosphere, maintenance of soil fertility, and maintenance of a
genetic library. Id. at 14.
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services were not recognized, they were not valuated. The first attempt to
assign numbers to the values ecosystem services was by Walter Westman
in1977, followed by an article by Edward Farnworth in 1981.30 By the 1990s,
the discipline of ecological economics was well under way, led by Robert
Costanza’s pioneering work.31 In the same decade, Gretchen Daily’s seminal
book Nature’s Services: Societal Dependence on Natural Ecosystems awoke the
general public to the role of ecosystems in delivering essential services to
humanity.32
Gretchen Daily defines ecosystem services as “the conditions and
processes through which natural ecosystems, and the species that make
them up, sustain and fulfill human life.”33 The intrinsic relationship between
biotic organisms and their abiotic environment makes a change in the
biogeochemical cycles or habitats, which necessarily affects the species in
the system, and changes in species subsequently affect ecosystem
processes. Human consumption of ecosystem services necessarily affects
the stock of natural capital necessary to support these same services.
Population growth and excessively consumptive lifestyles are large drivers of
ecosystem overexploitation, since more food, water, and raw materials are
required to meet human needs. This problem became particularly acute
after the industrial revolution, when technology made possible extraction of
natural resources and production using raw materials more efficiently and
faster. Irrigated crops, chemical fertilizers, and pesticides raised food
production, which in turn allowed for a huge expansion in the world’s
population. All these factors led to a misperception that natural resources
and the services they provide were free and unlimited. In addition, the
predominant policy was the allocation of natural resources exclusively for
human needs so as to maximize the production of commodities. This
extreme anthropocentric view blinded us to the fact that the continuous
delivery of these services depends on the maintenance of natural capital and
the complex interactions between its elements. If ecosystems are disturbed
beyond a certain level, the services they provide will be affected and
eventually lost.

30. J.B. RUHL ET AL., supra note 11, at 6.
31. In 1997, Robert Costanza put a valuation on the world’s ecosystem services
at $33 trillion, 1.8 times the annual global GDP at the time. Although the study was
highly criticized for its flaws, it nevertheless called the world’s attention for the high
value these services possess. See Barton H. Thompson Jr., Markets for Nature, 25 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 261 (2000).
32. DAILY, supra note 16.
33. DAILY, supra note 16, at 3.
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The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, initiated in 2001 and released
in 2005, introduced the concept of ecosystem services into the policy
debate34. This report was a comprehensive study to “assess the
consequences of ecosystem change for human well-being and the scientific
basis for actions needed to enhance the conservation and sustainable use of
those systems and their contribution to human well-being.”35 It was
conducted under the auspices of the United Nations in cooperation with
representatives of international institutions, governments, business, nongovernmental organization (“NGOs”), and indigenous peoples.36 The scope
of work was designed to meet the demands of four international
agreements, namely the Convention on Biological Diversity, the United
Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, the Ramsar Convention on
Wetlands, and the Convention on Migratory Species, along with other
ecosystem beneficiaries such as the business and health sector,
nongovernmental organizations, and indigenous peoples.37 The outcome
was the Synthesis Report and five additional detailed reports designed to
meet the needs of its own audience: the Biodiversity Synthesis (Convention
on Biological Diversity (“CBD”)); the Desertification Synthesis (United
Nations Convention to Combat Desertification); Wetlands & Water (the
Ramsar Convention on Wetlands); Opportunities & Challenges for Business
& Industry (business and industry sector) and Health Synthesis (health
sector).38
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment describes ecosystem services
as the benefits people obtain from ecosystems,39 and these benefits are
classified in four categories: i) Provisioning; ii) Regulating, iii) Cultural, and
iv) Supporting services; 40

34. Erik Gómez-Baggethun et al., The History of Ecosystem Services in Economic
Theory and Practice: From Early Notions to Markets and Payments Schemes, Ecological Economics
69 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1209 (2009).
35. MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING:
SYNTHESIS ii (2005).
36. Id.
37. Id. at v.
38. See OVERVIEW OF REPORTS, http://www.millenniumassessment.org/en/
Reports.aspx (last visited Dec. 16, 2010).
39. MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, supra note 35, at 53.
40. Id. at 40.
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TABLE 1:
Categories of Ecosystem Services
Category

Type of Service

Provisioning
Services – The
products obtained
from ecosystems.

Food. The vast range of food products derived from plants,
animals, and microbes.
Fiber. Materials included here are wood, jute, cotton, hemp,
silk, and wool.
Fuel. Wood, dung, and other biological materials serve as
sources of energy.
Genetic resources . The genes and genetic information used for
animal and plant breeding and biotechnology.
Biochemicals, natural medicines and pharmaceuticals. Many
medicines, biocides, food additives such as alginates, and
biological materials are derived from ecosystems.
Ornamental resources. Animal and plant products such as
skins, shells, and flowers are used as ornaments. Whole
plants are used for landscaping and ornaments.
Fresh water. People obtain fresh water from ecosystems, thus
the supply of fresh water can be considered a provisioning
service. Fresh water in rivers is also a source of energy.
However, because water is required for other life to exist, it
can also be considered a supporting service.

Regulating Services
– The benefits
obtained from the
regulation of
ecosystem
processes.

Air quality regulation. Ecosystems both contribute chemicals
to and extract chemicals from the atmosphere, influencing
many aspects of air quality.
Climate regulation. Ecosystems influence climate both locally
and globally. At a local scale, for example, changes in land
cover can affect both temperature and precipitation. At the
global scale, ecosystems play an important role in climate by
either sequestering or emitting greenhouse gases.
Water regulation. The timing and magnitude of runoff,
flooding, and aquifer recharge can be strongly influenced by
changes in land cover, including, in particular, alterations
that change the water storage potential of the system, such
as the conversion of wetlands or the replacement of forests
with croplands or croplands with urban areas.
Erosion regulation. Vegetative cover plays an important role in
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soil retention and the prevention of landslides.
Water purification and waste treatment. Ecosystems can be a
source of impurities (for instance, in fresh water) but also
can help filter out and decompose organic wastes introduced
into inland waters and coastal and marine ecosystems. They
assimilate and detoxify compounds through soil and subsoil
processes.
Disease regulation. Changes in ecosystems can directly change
the abundance of human pathogens, such as cholera, and
can alter the abundance of disease vectors, such as
mosquitoes.
Pest regulation. Ecosystem changes affect the prevalence of
crop and livestock pests and diseases.
Pollination. Ecosystem changes affect the distribution,
abundance, and effectiveness of pollinators.
Natural hazard regulation. The presence of coastal ecosystems
such as mangroves and coral reefs can reduce the damage
caused by hurricanes or large waves.
Cultural Services –
The nonmaterial
benefits people
obtain from
ecosystems
through spiritual
enrichment,
cognitive
development,
reflection,
recreation, and
aesthetic
experiences.

Cultural diversity. The diversity of ecosystems is one factor
influencing the diversity of cultures.
Spiritual and religious values. Many religions attach spiritual
and religious values to ecosystems or their components.
Knowledge systems. Ecosystems influence the types of
knowledge systems developed by different cultures.
Educational values. Ecosystems, their components, and their
processes provide the basis for both formal and informal
education in many societies.
Inspiration. Ecosystems provide a rich source of inspiration
for art, folklore, national symbols, architecture, and
advertising.
Aesthetic values. Many people find beauty or aesthetic value in
various aspects of ecosystems, as reflected in the support for
parks, scenic drives, and the selection of housing locations.
Social relations. Ecosystems influence the types of social
relations that are established in particular cultures. Fishing
societies, for example, differ in many respects in their social
relations from nomadic herding or agricultural societies.
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Sense of place. Many people value the “sense of place” that is
associated with recognized features of their environment,
including aspects of the ecosystem.
Cultural heritage values. Many societies place high value on the
maintenance of either historically important landscapes or
culturally significant species.

Recreation and ecotourism. People often choose where to spend
their leisure time based in part on the characteristics of the
natural or cultivated landscapes in a particular area.
Supporting Service
– Necessary for the
production of all
other ecosystem
services. They differ
from provisioning,
regulating, and
cultural services in
that their impacts
on people are often
indirect or occur
over a very long
period of time,
whereas changes in
the other
categories have
relatively direct and
short-term impact
on people.

Soil Formation. Because many provisioning services depend
on soil fertility, the rate of soil formation influences human
well-being in many ways.
Photosynthesis. Photosynthesis produces oxygen necessary for
most living organisms.
Primary production. The assimilation or accumulation of
energy and nutrients by organisms.
Nutrient cycling. Approximately 20 nutrients essential to life,
including nitrogen and phosphorus, cycle through
ecosystems and are maintained at different concentrations
in different parts of ecosystems.
Water cycling. Water cycles through ecosystems and is
essential for living organisms.

Source: Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Ecosystems and Human Well-being:
Synthesis (2005) at 40, Box 2.1.

The above definition encompasses ecosystem goods or commodities,
ecosystem structures and functions within the definition of ecosystem
services.41 Ecosystem goods such as food, fisheries, fibers, fuel, water, and
many other end products are easily recognized because they provide direct
benefit to humans and are traded in the marketplace. However, “ecosystem

41.

Id. at 56.
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structures” support the basic “functions” that sustain life and make possible
the production of ecosystem goods.42 Ecosystem structures refer to “the
composition of ecosystem (i.e., its various parts) and the physical and
biological organization defining how those parts are organized.”43
Ecosystem functions “[describe] . . . a process that takes place in an
ecosystem as a result of the interactions of plants, animals, and other
(micro) organisms in the ecosystem with each other or their environment
and that serves some purpose.”44 The Economics of Ecosystems &
Biodiversity Report characterizes ecosystem services as “the direct and
indirect contributions of ecosystems to human well-being.”45
James Boyd and Spencer Banzhaf, however, adopt a stricter definition
of ecosystem services.
For these authors, ecosystem services are
“components of nature, directly enjoyed, consumed, or used to yield human
well-being.”46
The authors draw a distinction between components,
functions or processes, and benefits. Components include resources such
as water, oceans, vegetation types, and species; they are end products of
nature. Ecosystem processes and functions are the biological, chemical,
and physical interactions between ecosystem components and are not end
products but intermediates to the production of these end products.47
Benefits are the joint use of ecosystem services and conventional goods and
services.48 Once an ecosystem service adds non-ecological inputs like
human labor and financial capital to obtain a particular service like
commercial harvests, they cannot be considered ecosystem services.49 These
authors propose that the value of ecosystem services should be captured in
the measurement of services in order to avoid double counting.50 “Our
insistence on the distinction between intermediate ecological processes and
final services may seem like a quibble. From the standpoint of practical

42. Barton H. Thompson, Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital: Reconceiving
Environmental Management, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL L.J. 460, 465 (2008).
43. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, VALUING ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: TOWARD BETTER
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING 60 (2004).
44. Id.
45. THE ECONOMICS OF ECOSYSTEMS AND BIODIVERSITY, MAINSTREAMING THE
ECONOMICS OF NATURE: A SYNTHESIS OF THE APPROACH, CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF TEEB 3 (2010).
46. JAMES BOYD & SPENCER BANZHAF, WHAT ARE ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: THE NEED FOR
STANDARDIZED ENVIRONMENTAL ACCOUNTING UNITS 8 (2006).
47. Id. at 8.
48. Id. at 9.
49. Id. at 23.
50. Id. at 9.
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measurement, however, it is not. Measuring processes is much more
difficult than measuring the outcomes of processes.”51 Although the
distinction between functions, services, and benefits is important, especially
for economic valuation, it often is not possible to make a fully consistent
classification, especially for regulating services, and there is no consensus
among the experts on the taxonomy.52 Nevertheless, for the purpose of this
paper, we will refer to ecosystem structure, function, services, and goods as
“ecosystem services” that can be either a final or an intermediary service.
The unique feature presented by ecosystem services is that they are
not like other goods or services that move throughout our economy. They
cannot be selected for rate, location or combination,53 and in most cases,
they cannot be separated from their physical setting. They are ecologically,
geographically, and economically much more complex than any other kind
of commodity or service traded in the marketplace.54 In addition, the
complexity is not limited to the interactions and synergies between humans
and ecosystems; rather, it also encompasses the relationship between
different ecosystems, in different levels and scales. Changes in one
provisioning service may affect other regulating or supporting services, and
our knowledge in this regard is still in its infancy.55 As an example, “species
that stray outside of their natural habitats can have deadly consequences for
people and biodiversity alike.”56 Our partial knowledge on the interactions
between ecosystem structures and functions and the extent to which they
provide ecosystem services make the task of accessing and measuring them
daunting. Although mapping ecosystem services does not proceed linearly
from ecosystem structure,57 the effort of continuous study is worth it in order
to obtain a more sustainable use of our natural capital and continued wellbeing of both present and future generations.58

51. Id. at 16.
52. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 43, at 77.
53. J.B. RUHL ET AL., supra note 11, at 32.
54. Id. at 13.
55. Id. at 35.
56. NAGLE & RUHL, supra note 6, at 31.
57. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 43, at 77.
58. While Professor B. H. Thompson is pleased with the progress made by the
Natural Capital Project (See THOMPSON, supra note 42, at 473), R. B. Norgaard argues
the stock-flow framework adopted is insufficient for the complexities involved and
might blind us to the necessary major institutional changes that are required. See
Richard B. Norgaard, Ecosystem Services: From Eye-opening Metaphor to Complexity Blinder,
69 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1219 (2010).
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A simple look at the above list of services provided in Table 1
demonstrates our dependency on functioning ecosystems. In the early1990s
an initiative called “Biosphere 2” tried to reproduce all natural conditions
within a sealed and artificial ecological system. It aimed to reproduce many
of the functioning ecosystems found on Earth. The first group of scientists
entered the structure in 1991 and the last group in 199459 when the sponsors
decided to shut down the project. During those three years the ecosystems
collapsed and ceased providing services. Aquatic systems accumulated
excess nutrients, natural pest control failed since all pollinators were
extinct, along with most vertebrate species. At the same time, ants and
cockroaches flourished. Oxygen concentrations in the atmosphere dropped
and nitrous oxide spiked upward dramatically. Carbon dioxide fluctuated
erratically.60
As the Biosphere 2 project demonstrated, mankind has not yet been
able to engineer technological substitutes for the services that nature
delivers “for free” and in the very few cases where humans were able to
design and implement a reasonable facsimile — as in the case of water
filtration, for example — it proved to be far too expensive.61 Much research
is still needed to understand how such complex systems work and as
Professor Ruhl et al. point out “knowing how ecosystem services operate
ecologically will not guarantee sound economic and policy decisions about
the environment, but not knowing . . . will guarantee unsound economic and
policy decisions.”62
These and many other challenges, along with the alarming rate at
which ecosystems and biodiversity have been degraded in the past decades,
led the international community to agree to establish the Intergovernmental
Science-Policy Platform for Biodiversity and Ecosystem services (“IPBES”) in
the 3rd UNEP facilitated meeting held in South Korea in June 2010.63 The
IPBES parallels what the IPCC represents for climate change and was
established with the goal of strengthening the dialogue between science and

59. BIOSPHERE 2, http://www.b2science.org/PDF/b2timeline.pdf (last visited Dec.
16, 2010).
60. Geoffrey Heal et al., Protecting Natural Capital Through Ecosystem Service Districts,
20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 333, 338-39 (2001).
61. See Table 3: The NYC Watershed Agreement.
62. J. B. RUHL ET AL., supra note 11, at 35.
63. Intergovernmental Meeting, United Nations Environment Programme:
Busan Outcome, (June 11, 2010), http://www.ipbes.net/meetings/Documents/ipbes3/
K1030396-IPBES-3-L.2Rev1.pdf
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policy and to help building a uniform and consistent framework for
addressing biodiversity and ecosystem services challenges.64

C. Freshwater Ecosystems
1. Water Resources and Freshwater Ecosystems
The hydrosphere covers approximately seventy percent of the world’s
surface, and water is found in three phases: liquid, solid and gas. Nearly
97.5 percent of the world’s surface is saltwater with fresh water comprising
only 2.5 percent of the amount of water resources.65
FIGURE 1:
Global Distribution of Water Resources*

64. IPBES, WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW, available at http://www.ipbes.net/images/
stories/documents/whatyouneedtoknow_ipbes.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2010).
65. UNESCO-WWAP, WATER: A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY, THE UNITED NATIONS
WORLD WATER DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2, 121 (2006), available at http://unesdoc.unesco.
org/images/0014/001454/145405E.pdf.
*
UNESCO-WWAP, WATER: A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY, THE UNITED NATIONS WORLD
WATER DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2, 121 Figure 4.1 (2006).
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Water cycles throughout the spheres driven by solar energy and
gravity, and this hydrological cycle provides the supply of renewable fresh
water for nature and humans. Water forms the snowpack and provides
critical water flow to support regions such as the Andes and the Himalayas,
where the ice cap and glaciers partially melt during spring and summer.
Water evaporates from oceans and surface water bodies, and transpires from
plants to the atmosphere where it condensates and precipitates over the
oceans, rivers, lakes, land, and wetlands. Approximately forty percent of the
precipitation that falls on land comes from ocean-derived vapor. The
remaining sixty percent comes from land-based sources.66
After
precipitating, water infiltrates the soil and is absorbed by plants or
replenishes aquifers, providing most of our renewable freshwater supply.
The rate of renewal may vary significantly. Water in the atmosphere is
renewed every eight days and takes about sixteen days to recycle water in
streams and rivers.67 The renewal period of glaciers, ground water, large
lakes and the oceans vary from hundreds to thousands of years.68
However, water is also a nonrenewable resource. Water is considered
a nonrenewable a resource by virtue of the fact that the finite supply of
freshwater is routinely consumed at a faster rate than it can be recharged.69
Groundwater plays a critical role feeding springs and streams, supporting
wetlands70 and maintaining stability in areas of unstable ground. It still
serves as a source of water supply for human needs in many regions
throughout the globe and withdrawal in these areas are one of the main
pressures that water faces currently. Because these aquifers have a
negligible rate of recharge on the human time scale they are considered
nonrenewable resources and even small amounts of groundwater withdrawal
make its extraction unsustainable.

66.
67.

Id. at 123.
IGOR A. SHIKLOMANOV, WORLD FRESH WATER RESOURCES, IN WATER IN CRISIS: A
GUIDE TO THE WORLD’S FRESH WATER RESOURCES 15 (Peter H. Gleick ed., 1993).
68. Id. at 15.
69. MEENA PALANIAPPAN & PETER H. GLEICK, THE PEAK WATER, in GLEIK ET AL., THE
WORLD’S WATER 2008-2009: THE BIENNIAL REPORT ON FRESHWATER RESOURCES 1, 4 (Peter
H. Gleick ed., 2009).
70. ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: CURRENT STATE AND TRENDS, VOLUME 1,
supra note 2, 557 (2005).

208

West

Northwest, Vol. 18, No. 1, Winter 2012

When computing water resources hydrologists usually don’t compute
what is called “green water” rather they compute only “blue water.”71 In
simple terms, blue water is the water that precipitates and flows in rivers,
lakes and is stored in aquifers.72 Green water is the invisible flow of water
that transpirates and evaporates into the atmosphere.73 Because this water
is no longer available for local withdrawal and is hard to track in the
hydrological cycle, it is considered a loss. The evaporation from plants is
called “productive green water” because it indicates production of biomass
through photosynthesis as compared with the purely physical and
uncontrolled evaporation from surface waters, which is called “unproductive
green water.”74 Terrestrial ecosystems are “green water” dependants,75 and
despite aquatic ecosystems being mostly blue water dependants, the quality
and flow of blue water depends also on the green water cycle.
Although all ecosystems are water dependant, ecologists tend to
classify aquatic ecosystems as those where there is a “dominance of water in
the internal structure and functions of an area.”76 As a result, these systems
might include streams, rivers, ponds, lakes, estuaries, wetlands, and
groundwater, and cannot be analyzed without considering the linkages to
adjacent terrestrial environments.77 The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
identifies freshwater ecosystems as inland water systems. Freswater
ecosystems are defined as “permanent water bodies inland from the coastal
zone and areas whose properties and use are dominated by the permanent,
seasonal, or intermittent occurrence of flooded conditions,” while inland
waters include “rivers, lakes, floodplains, reservoirs, wetlands, and inland

71. FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, WATER REPORTS: REVIEW OF
WORLD WATER RESOURCES BY COUNTRY 23, 8 (2003) available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/
fao/005/y4473E/y4473e02.pdf.
72. FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, WATER REPORTS: REVIEW OF
WORLD WATER RESOURCES BY COUNTRY 23, 8 Box 2 (2003) available at ftp://ftp.
fao.org/docrep/fao/005/y4473E/y4473e02.pdf.
73. WOLFRAM MAUSER, WATER RESOURCES: EFFICIENT, SUSTAINABLE AND EQUITABLE
USE 29 (Karen Schneider trans., Haus Publishing 2009).
74. Id. at 29-31.
75. ANIL AGARWAL ET AL., INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 24 (Global
Water Partnership, 2000), available at http://waterwiki.net/images/6/62/GWPbackground
IWRMpaper.pdf.
76. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 59.
77. Id.
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saline systems.”78 They encompass an area of 10.3 million square feet; the
equivalent of seven percent of the terrestrial surface of Earth.79
2. Freshwater Ecosystem Services
Water is among one of our most precious natural resources. Due to its
unique molecular properties, water is the major component of most cells
and living tissues, and is vital to the transport of nutrients throughout the
biosphere. Water is the best-known natural solvent and has exceptionally
high melting and boiling points.80 The large amount of heat that is stored in
the water molecule provides benefits ranging from climate regulation to
machinery cooling.81 In its liquid state water creates the so-called “third
equilibrium,” which is a stage of physical equilibrium characterized by a
close interaction between the carbon and the water cycle via vegetation,
regulating the amount of oxygen and greenhouse gases in the atmosphere,
and maintaining conditions suitable for life.82 Photosynthesis depends on
water and carbon dioxide to produce sugar and oxygen, producing biomass,
and supporting the whole food chain. Biological processes also depend on
water to receive dissolved nutrients from chemical processes involved in the
weathering of rocks and nutrient runoff. Water has been essential for the
maintenance and operation of Earth’s life support system for the past 2.7
billion years.83
In the international arena, the dimension of the role played by water
resources in life-supporting systems and the significance of managing these
resources in an “integrated” manner was defined in 1992 during the
International Conference on Water and the Environment (“ICWE”) held in
Dublin.84 This was the last technical preparatory meeting before the U.N.
Conference on Environment and Development (known as the “Earth
Summit“) and resulted in the Dublin Statement, which embodies the four
Dublin guiding principles:
Principle 1: Fresh water is a finite and vulnerable resource,
essential to sustain life, development and the environment.

78. MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, supra note 35, at 30.
79. Id. at 31.
80. MCKINNEY ET. AL, supra note 18, at 243.
81. MAUSER, supra note 74, at 8-10.
82. Id. at 13-18.
83. Id. at 18.
84. THE DUBLIN STATEMENT ON WATER AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, available at
http://www.gdrc.org/uem/water/dublin-statement.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2010).
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Principle 2: Water development and management should be
based on a participatory approach, involving users, planners and
policy-makers at all levels.
Principle 3: Women play a central part in the provision,
management and safeguarding of water.
Principle 4: Water has an economic value in all its competing
uses and should be recognized as an economic good.85
When water is available in both quantity and quality freshwater
ecosystems deliver a number of services essential to the support of human
life and well-being. However, human use of freshwater ecosystems often
conflicts. As Principle 1 stresses, an effective management of water
resources demands a holistic approach, linking social and economic
development with protection of natural ecosystems.86
a. Domestic Use
The most basic human need is drinking water; followed by water to
grow and cook food. Water is necessary for washing, cleaning, and
sanitation. To survive, humans need an average of 3.75 liters or one gallon
of water per day for biological needs.87 Considering the water required for
personal hygiene, washing, sanitary, and sewage purposes, the flow required
for healthy living conditions averages between twenty to forty liters per
person a day.88 However, domestic consumption varies greatly throughout
the world. In the United States domestic water use average per year is 203
m3/p (cubic meters per person)89 while in Nigeria it accounts for 13 m3/p, in
Brazil it is estimated to be 65 m3/p, in Germany it is 57m3/p and in China, 27
m3/p.90 Although domestic use should reflect numbers that are close to the

85. THE DUBLIN STATEMENT ON WATER AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, available at
http://www.gdrc.org/uem/water/dublin-statement.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2010).
86. MAUSER, supra note 74, at 68.
87. MCKINNEY ET. AL, supra note 18, at 245.
88. MAUSER, supra note 74, at 118.
89. Each cubic meter is equal to 1,000 liters.
90. Data from 2000 and 2001. See GLEIK ET AL., supra note 67, at 22 Data Table 2.
Fresh Water Withdrawal by Country and Sector. The use of water varies greatly from
country to country and from region to region. For an updated and comprehensive
assessment of water consumption the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations (FAO) maintains a database called AQUASTAT with consistent
information. See FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS (“FAO”),
AQUASTAT, available at http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/main/index.stm (last visited
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average required for basic human needs, the disparities between countries
demonstrated above illustrates how local water availability and lifestyles
affect this minimum domestic consumption.
On a global scale there are enough water resources and technologies
to meet basic human needs. Nevertheless, the number of people in the
world without access to safe drinking water and sanitation compelled the
United Nations to sponsor a summit in 2000 that led to the adoption of the
U.N. Millennium Declaration,91 urging nations to implement measures to
reduce extreme poverty, hunger, and disease by 2015 through
implementation of the Millennium Development Goals. Target three of the
Seventh Millennium Development Goal aims to “halve, by 2015, the
proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and
basic sanitation.”92 Water plays a key role in poverty alleviation because it
protects and improves health, is essential for food security, and strongly
contributes to economic development. Safe drinking water and sanitation
have already proved to be one of the most efficient ways of improving
human health, simply by providing the means for people to avoid water
borne diseases.93 Furthermore, access to water and sanitation improves the
level of education of women, particularly in Africa, since it negates the need
for them to spend hours fetching water, and means that they don’t have to
miss classes due to lack of appropriate sanitation.94 The world as a whole is
likely to meet the target of halving the proportion of population without
access to safe drinking water,95 but is not likely to meet the target regarding
access to improved sanitation facilities.96
The eight Millennium
Development Goals are a good example of the role played by water in
sustaining life and achieving welfare, since meeting the MDG for water and
Dec. 16, 2010). A caveat must be made, however, since data comes from a variety of
sources and some are effectively measured and some are only estimated. Data also
come from different years making direct comparison difficult. See GLEICK ET AL., supra
note 67, at 202.
91. G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000), available at
http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2010).
92. U.N. Millennium Development Goals Home Page, available online at
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/environ.shtml (last visited Dec. 16, 2010).
93. UNESCO-WWAP, supra note 63, at 88.
94. Id.
95. With the exception of Sub-Saharan Africa, Oceania, and the Asian
countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States that still fall behind the 2015
target for drinking water access. See GLEIK ET AL., supra note 67, at 65.
96. Millennium Development Goal 7 Fact Sheet, available online at http://
www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2008highlevel/pdf/newsroom/Goal%207%20FINAL.pdf
(last visited Dec. 16, 2010).
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sanitation provides the foundation for and is critical to achieving all of the
other development goals.97 However, lack of adequate institutions and
infrastructure in many places in the world still prevents us from reaching the
sanitation goals and improving safe drinking water numbers. In poor areas,
captured fish and agriculture is the main source of income and livelihood.
Other sources of income usually derive from handicrafts that also depend
upon water directly or indirectly such as brick making, basket making, textile
weaving, and beer brewing.98 Water is critical for food production, especially
during critical crop-growing seasons. Studies demonstrate that a boost in
agriculture production is the first step toward achieving economic
development and shifting from agriculture-based into industrialized-based
economies.99
b. Agriculture
Water resources are essential to food production. In simple terms,
water is one of the elements that make photosynthesis occur, thus
supporting the whole food chain. Worldwide, sixty-nine percent of water
resources are used by agriculture,100 as irrigation is the primary consumer of
water on earth101 and also the activity that wastes the most.102 With irrigated
agriculture, a huge amount of water is simply wasted due to inefficient
irrigation systems.103 Even when run-off returns to the streams, it is usually
degraded by fertilizers, pesticides, and salts.104 What has made possible the
population’s exponential growth in the last ninety years was irrigated
agriculture.105 However the large amount of withdrawals that irrigated
agriculture requires and the inefficiency of the method pose severe threats
to the resource, limiting further expansion and even threatening current
production in areas that already face water scarcity.
Under the hydrologists point of view, however, even more efficient
methods of irrigation do not ensure more water efficiency, because more
water is lost by a larger area of transpiration. The situation is particularly

97. GLEIK ET AL., supra note 67, at 73.
98. UNESCO-WWAP, supra note 63, at 86.
99. Id. at 81-82.
100. Data of 1990. See SHIKLOMANOV, supra note 65, at 20.
101. Id. at 19.
102. MCKINNEY ET AL., supra note 18, at 242.
103. Id. at 246.
104. Sandra Postel, Water and Agriculture in WATER IN CRISIS 57 (1993).
105. Id.
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problematic in arid regions and with water-intensive crops. Each crop
requires a certain amount of water to build biomass that is absorbed by its
roots, and some crops are highly water demanding when compared to
others. As an example, the global average volume of water required to grow
one apple is seventy liters while 1,300 liters are required to produce one
kilogram of wheat.106 Similarly, 15,500 liters is the minimum amount of
water necessary to produce one kilogram of beef.107 The large disparity
between water required to produce crops and animal products is due to the
fact that animals feed mostly on crops to produce biomass and only about
ten percent of this energy goes into the meat.108 In addition, even assuming
an efficient irrigation system, not all biomass produced by plants are
consumed by humans, and leftovers such as stalks, thorns, and leaves
correspond to approximately two-thirds of the total biomass produced.109 As
a result, simply put, crops need three units of water to produce one unit of
food.
The role water plays in the production of biofuels must also be
considered. Bioenergy can be produced from corn and other grains, sugar
cane, beets, organic oil, cellulose and organic wastes.110 Used as an
alternative to fossil fuels, the production of biodiesel tripled between 2000
and 2007 to an estimated 77 billion liters in 2008.111 However, as with any
other crop, production of biodiesel requires large amounts of water
withdrawals in irrigated areas and recently has raised concerns about
inflating the price of food commodities and causing increased deforestation.
In addition, “[a]mong current technologies only ethanol produced from
sugarcane, ethanol produced as a by-product of cellulose production and
biodiesel produced from animal fats and used cooking oil can substantially
reduce greenhouse gas emissions compared with gasoline and mineral
diesel.”112

106. Product Water Footprints, http://www.waterfootprint.org/?page=files/
productgallery (last visited Dec. 16, 2010).
107. Id. These examples are illustrative, and calculating the water footprint
depends on several factors such as the place and period of production, water use
efficiency methods and the accounting methodology.
108. MAUSER, supra note 74, at 130.
109. MAUSER, supra note 69, at 128-129.
110. ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: CURRENT STATE AND TRENDS, VOLUME 1,
supra note 2, at 110.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 111.
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Fisheries and Aquaculture

Freshwater ecosystems also support fisheries and aquaculture,
providing eleven percent of global fish consumption in 2006.113 Inland
fisheries contribute to local economic development and poverty alleviation.
In some regions, this is the only source of daily animal protein intake for the
population. The aquaculture industry has been growing at an average rate
of 8.9 percent per year since 1970,114 and along with fish capture is an
important source of export revenue as well as direct and indirect
employment.115 However, when not designed and managed properly,
aquaculture has contributed to habitat degradation, pollution, spread of
diseases, and introduction of invasive species; all of which increase the
pressure on freshwater ecosystems.116
d. Industrial Use
The second largest user of water resources is the industrial sector,
which withdraws an average of 23.6 percent.117 Industrial production is
dependent upon water in many ways. Water resources are used to generate
electricity and to cool thermoelectric generation processes like nuclear,
coal-fired, natural gas power plants, and even solar thermal plants.118 Water
is also used in petroleum refineries, chemical processing, natural gas
processing, food processing, semiconductor plants, as well as the
production of metal, cement, paper and cellulose. In addition, water is used
to remove industrial wastes. “Probably every manufactured product uses
water during some part of the production process,” but “[s]ome industries
113. Id. at 122.
114. WATER IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 2, at 571.
115. UNESCO-WWAP, supra note 2, at 121-122.
116. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, supra note 35, at 572.
117. Shiklomanov, supra note 64, at 20.
118. Typically, thermoelectric generators are used for cooling water because
they are more efficient and economic, but in areas of water scarcity these can no
longer be the alternative. The limiting factor is not the cost of water itself but its
availability. Wet-cooling systems consume much less water than once-through
cooling systems, yet it is more expensive and consumes more energy. However,
when taking into account the environmental effects of once-through cooling system,
it falls out of favor. Photovoltaic solar plants don’t consume water to generate power
but the steel that goes into power plants does. Erica Gies, “Water Adds New
Constraints to Power,” N.Y. Times, May 17, 2010 available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/18/business/energy-environment/18iht-rencal.html?
scp=1&sq=solar%20power%20plants%20cooling&st=cse (Last visited on Dec. 16,
2010).
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that use large amounts of water produce such commodities as food, paper,
chemicals, refined petroleum, or primary metals.”119
The practice of using “grey water” has been increasing, largely in
Australia.120 Grey water, also called recycled or reclaimed water, is the
wastewater that is recycled and reused for industrial cooling, washing, boiler
feed, transport and separation, and some process uses after some kind of
treatment.121
e. Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology
Aquatic ecosystems may also contribute as sources of pharmaceutical
products. Plant and animal-based remedies constitute an integral part of
traditional medicine in both rural and urban areas in many countries
throughout the world. According to a new study published in Tropical
Conservation Science, a surprising number of invertebrates are used in
Brazilian traditional medicines. Researchers discovered that at least eightyone species from five taxonomic groups, among them some estuarine
species, are being used to treat a variety of illnesses.122 Biodiversity is also
the essential “raw material” for the biotechnology industry. As an example,
a thermophilic bacterium collected from the hot springs at Yellowstone
National Park provided the heat-stable enzyme Taq Polymerase, which made
possible medical diagnoses, forensic analyses, and basic research that was
impossible just ten years ago.123
f.

Instream Uses

Finally, freshwater ecosystems also support instream uses that are not
reflected in statistic water uses because such uses cannot be measured in

119. United States Geological Survey, Industrial Water Use, http://ga.water.
usgs.gov/edu/wuin.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2010).
120. INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABILITY AND INNOVATION AT VICTORIA UNIVERSITY, GUIDANCE
FOR THE USE OF RECYCLED WATER BY INDUSTRY (2008), available at http://www.
smartwater.com.au/projects/round4/vicuni/Documents/VicUni_LiteratureReview_Rec
ycledWaterUseForIndustry.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2010).
121. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, WATER RECYCLING AND REUSE: THE
ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS,available at http://www.epa.gov/region9/water/recycling
/brochure.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2010).
122. Rômulo R. N. Alves & Thelma. L. P. Dias, Usos de invertebrados na medicina
popular no Brasil e suas implicações para conservação, 3 TROPICAL CONSERVATION SCI. 159
(2010), available at http://tropicalconservationscience.mongabay.com/content/v3/1006-28_159-174_Alves&Dias.pdf.
123. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 50.
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volume terms.124
These non-extractive uses can be classified as
transportation, cultural, recreational, aesthetic, and ecosystem needs.
Freshwater ecosystems have served for many centuries as waterways
for transportation of goods and mail. River navigation was part of the Indus
Valley Civilization in Northwest India around 3300 BCE and remains an
important activity in many of the major rivers in the world.125 Nevertheless,
inland shipping remains an underdeveloped sector on most waterways
despite its cost-effectiveness and despite being the least polluting means of
transportation.126
Since the beginning of humanity, nature has been a source of
inspiration, aesthetic beauty, and spiritual relief, albeit these cultural
services may be perceived, experienced and valued differently by different
cultures. This appreciation is well demonstrated in our cultures, religions,
artistic expressions and architectures. People across cultures and different
regions demonstrate, in general, an aesthetic preference for natural over
urban or built environments.127 The very contemplation of a lake or river is a
source of vast pleasure and peace for many. “The most common element of
all religions throughout history has been the inspiration they have drawn
from nature. . . . The idea of “unity” between humans and nature is present
in all major religions and influences the management of ecosystems and our
attitude toward species. The concept of Sarvabhutadaya in Buddhism implies
that humans are an integral part of the ecosystem, with a sense of
compassion and fellowship — that we give back what we have taken from
the biosphere. In the Bible and the Koran, reference is made to the
importance of nature as a source of life for humans and their fellowcreatures.”128 “Traditional societies all over the world have institutionalized
sacred landscapes and ecosystems in a variety of ways, large and small, as
part of their belief systems.”129 Hindu, Judaic, Christian, and Islamic
traditions stress the symbolism of water in spiritual purification.130 Lake
Titicaca in Bolivia was the holy place of all ancient Andean cultures and the

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING, supra note 2, at 100.
Id. at 120.
Id. at 121.
MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, supra note 35, at 120.
Id. at 463.
Id.
PETER G. BROWN AND JEREMY J. SCHMIDT, WATER ETHICS: FOUNDATIONAL
READINGS FOR STUDENTS AND PROFESSIONALS 48 (Island Press 2010).
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source of a hundred cosmogenic myths.131 In some societies, ecosystems
also provide the basis for formal and informal education132 and influence the
types of social relations that are established in particular cultures.133 The
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment reported that “spiritual and cultural
values of ecosystems were as important as other services for many local
communities, both in developing countries . . . and industrial ones.”134
Recreation and ecotourism is a source of not only aesthetic pleasure
and well-being but also huge revenues. Due to an increase in environmental
awareness, economic conditions and appropriate infrastructure, ecotourism
has grown substantially in the past twenty-five years. Recreation and
tourism have different values for people in developed countries and for
people in developing countries — in the United States it represents a very
important industry while in developing countries it is now the primary
economic development strategy.135 Freshwater recreational uses fit in
several categories, such as swimming, boating, sports fishing, kayaking,
canoeing, and rafting.136 In the United States these activities achieved such
an importance that land which was previously dedicated to commodity
extraction has now been protected by federal public land management
agencies specifically to preserve and encourage such activites.137 The
emergence of recreation and tourism as a dominant use generated several
conflicts with other users.138 The Multiple Use, Sustained Yield Act is an
attempt to reconcile growing and competing interests in the use of natural
“renewable and non-renewable surface resources” such as outdoor
recreation, range, timbers, minerals, watershed, wildlife, fish, natural scenic,
scientific, and historical values.139 Despite the noble purpose of the act,

131. MARTIN GRAY, OCEAN, LAKE, RIVER AND SPRING: SACRED WATERS, MYTH AND
TRANSFORMATION, available at http://www.sacredsites.com/martin_gray/documents/
sacred_waters.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2010).
132. Educational services of ecosystems assessed in Sweden, Brazil, and
Portugal are all increasing due to growing levels of awareness of the value and
benefits of, and thus the demand for, environmental education. See MILLENNIUM
ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, supra note 35, at 120.
133. Id. at 40.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. SANDRA POSTEL & STEPHEN CARPENTER, FRESHWATER ECOSYSTEM SERVICES, in
NATURE’S SERVICES 195, 202 (G. C. Daily ed. 1997).
137. ZYGMUNT J. B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW,
AND SOCIETY 1198 (3rd ed. 2003).
138. Id.
139. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (West 2010).
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administrators struggle to balance and accommodate such different uses in
a sustained yield.
Among all users of water resources Nature is probably the most
important because it makes possible not only the delivery of all services
already mentioned, but also provides structures and processes that make
possible their delivery, sustaining human, animal and plant life and
habitats. Healthy aquatic ecosystems depend on water quality, flow and
adequate temperature so as to maintain their capacity to provide services.
Once these needs are met, they provide several services such as climate and
hydrological regulation; nutrient distribution and primary production;
sheltering, breeding and habitat for many species; waste dilution and
detoxification, prevention from soil erosion and siltation, and a buffer
against natural hazards.
Worldwide, over twelve percent of all wildlife species live in freshwater
ecosystems, and many others depend on these ecosystems for their
survival.140 Freshwater aquatic species include forty-one percent of the
world’s known fish and most of the world’s endangered fish species.141
Seasonal flooding provides habitat for many aquatic species to spawn,
breed, and maintain nursery grounds.142 Terrestrial ecosystems are also
utterly dependent on precipitation, stormwater runoff and seasonal
flooding. The water cycle plays a major role in climate regulation,
distributing energy, and stabilizing temperature. Water in the atmosphere is
one of the main mechanisms for the redistribution of heat around the globe,
and generally makes for more equitable climates.143 Water ecosystems also
perform hydrological regulation, accumulating water during wet periods and
providing a reserve of water during dry periods.144 Large reservoirs and
channels are mostly built by humans. Water is one of the elements that
make photosynthesis possible, not only producing the biomass that
sustains the whole food chain, but also regulating the amount of
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere because distinctive freshwater

140. NAGLE & RUHL, supra note 6, at 584. Freshwater-dependent ecosystems are
mangroves, intertidal zones, and estuaries, which themselves provide another set of
services.
141. POSTEL & CARPENTER, supra note 141, at 204.
142. Id. at 205.
143. MCKINNEY ET AL., supra note 18, at 59.
144. ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: CURRENT STATE AND TRENDS, VOLUME 1,
supra note 2, at 555.
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ecosystems, such as wetlands, act as carbon sinks.145 As a result, freshwater
ecosystems play a critical role in climate change mitigation.
Water fertilizes the soil through floods, nutrient runoff, and rock
weathering. The hydrologic cycle plays a prominent role in the weathering
and decomposition of rocks146 and distributes nutrients through surface
runoff: “[w]eathering from geological sources generally produces relatively
small quantities of nutrients over long periods of time but is nevertheless an
important input mechanism that sustains the levels of potassium, iron,
aluminum, sodium, and silicon in natural ecosystems.”147 Both the
hydrological and the sedimentary cycle148 are responsible for the distribution
of six elements throughout the spheres: hydrogen, carbon, oxygen, nitrogen,
phosphorus and sulfur. These elements are essential to sustain life.149 At
the same time that natural floods provide essential nutrients distribution on
soil from alluvial deposits and wetlands recharge, they may constitute a
threat to human settlements and be implicated in substantial economic
losses.
It is important to note that strategic aquatic vegetation is able to
attenuate surface flows, providing protection against natural hazards and
recharging groundwater aquifers through soil infiltration. To this end, the
soil structure and texture is of fundamental importance.150
These
groundwater aquifers are critical to human water supply, as explained
previously, and also feed several wetlands151 which are among the most
biological productive areas.152 Due to its saturation, the wetlands provide
water, nutrients, shelter and habitat for many species. As a result, wetlands
provide high fish and shellfish harvesting. Wetlands are crucial in flood
protection and mitigation, sediment control, and filtration against nutrient
runoff and other pollutants. Because wetlands function as an excellent
natural filtration system, in the 1970s these ecosystems began to be
adopted as a cost effective alternative to the construction of tertiary

145. Id. at 558.
146. MCKINNEY ET AL., supra note 18, at 59.
147. Id. at 339.
148. The sedimentary cycle includes the processes of physical or chemical
erosion, nutrient transport, and sediment formation. See SUSAN E. ALEXANDER ET AL.,
THE INTERACTION OF CLIMATE AND LIFE, in NATURE’S SERVICES 74 (G. C. Daily ed. 1997).
149. Id.
150. ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING, supra note 2, at 445.
151. See supra note 65.
152. MCKINNEY ET AL., supra note 18, at 79.
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wastewater treatment facilities in many communities in the United States.153
The ability of wetlands, as well any other aquatic ecosystem, to degrade and
reduce the concentration of waste depends on both the properties of the
waste and the properties of the particular ecosystem.154 Waste degradation
is made possible due to the presence of microbes that break down organic
chemicals, and the number of waste degrading microbes in turn depends on
prior exposure to the waste.155 Nevertheless, compounds synthesized by the
chemical industry are quite resistant to microbial degradation.156 Another
key function that wetlands perform is to reduce concentrations of nitrogen
in water.157 “Some wetlands have been found to reduce the concentration of
nitrate by 90%, and artificially constructed wetlands have been developed
specifically to treat nitrogen-rich sewage effluents.”158 Wetlands also act as a
filter or trap for carbon-rich sediments and many waterborne wastes,
including metals, organic chemicals, and pathogens.159 Until recently these
useful services were neither understood nor recognized. In addition, human
utilization of one service, such as wastewater treatment, presents risk of
diminution or even loss of other services.160 The progressive loss of
wetlands all around the globe in the past century led the international
community to sign the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands in 1971, providing
the framework for national action and international cooperation for the
conservation and wise use of wetlands and their resources.161
Despite wetlands being the major providers of sediment retention and
water purification, riparian vegetation not classified as wetlands also play an
important role as buffer zones, trapping sediments, nutrients and
pollutants. In the United States, the restoration of riparian vegetation is
one of the best management practices in use to protect the internal waters
of the country when dealing with non point source pollution, especially

153. KATHERINE C. EWEL, WATER QUALITY IMPROVEMENT BY WETLANDS, in NATURE’S
SERVICES 332 (G. C. Daily ed. 1997).
154. ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING, supra note 2, at 425.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 426.
157. Id. at 436.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. EWEL, supra note 151, at 338.
161. Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat.
Ramsar, U.S.-Iran, February 2, 1971. U.N. TREATY SERIES NO. 14583. (As amended by the
Paris Protocol, Dec. 3, 1982, and the Regina Amendments, May 28, 1987).

221

West

Northwest, Vol. 18, No. 1, Winter 2012

agricultural runoff.162 Phosphorous and nitrogen runoff from fertilizers and
pesticides used by agricultural activities are the main causes of
eutrophication in water bodies, leading algal blooms and oxygen
depletion.163 Riparian vegetation also plays a major role in protecting
stream banks from erosion and sedimentation.164
In addition to the role played by wetlands in degrading waste, other
aquatic ecosystems may also dilute waste by dispersion and advection.165
These approaches were used for centuries up to the point at which the load
of waste far exceeded the capacity of the environment to process them
without undesirable change to the ecosystem.166 In the United States this
was the reality in the 1970s when laws like the Clean Water Act were passed,
requiring cities and industries to treat their wastewater before discharging it
into water bodies.167 Nevertheless, virtually all countries, “still depend
heavily upon the diluting capacity of natural waters.”168
With all these functions played by fresh water and their ecosystems,
Wilhelm Ripl draws an analogy to the human body, calling water the
“bloodstream of the biosphere.”169 Undoubtedly, several ecosystems depend
on freshwater ecosystems that are functioning well and “the contribution of
freshwater ecosystems are complemented by the services provided by other
kinds of ecosystems.”170 For this reason, a good understanding of the
relationship between humans, plants, animals and habitats is crucial for
meaningful policy in water and ecosystem management. As mentioned
above, the links between structure, function and services provided by
aquatic ecosystems is neither linear nor straightforward. The behavior of a
particular ecosystem is dependent not only on its composition and
stressors, but also on linkages to surrounding systems — and these

162. USDA, NRCS, CONSERVATION BUFFERS TO REDUCE PESTICIDE LOSSES (2000),
available at http://www.in.nrcs.usda.gov/technical/agronomy/newconbuf.pdf (last
visited Dec. 16, 2010); NYS STORMWATER MANAGEMENT DESIGN MANUAL, Chapter 10,
available at http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/water_pdf/dpremoval.pdf (last visited Dec.
16, 2010).
163. ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING, supra note 2, at 437.
164. Id. at 556.
165. Id. at 429
166. Id.
167. POSTEL & CARPENTER, supra note 141, at 200.
168. Id.
169. Wilhelm Ripl, Water: The Bloodstream of the Biosphere, 358 PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC.
LOND. B 1921 (2003).
170. NAGLE & RUHL, supra note 6, at 39.
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interconnections are not yet fully understood.171 The response to this lack of
knowledge has been the development of generalized lists of potential
functions that relate to broad categories of aquatic ecosystems.172 Although
the list of potential functions performed by aquatic ecosystems can be
estimated, it is a continuously evolving process. Overall, services provided
by freshwater ecosystems fit within the four categories used by the
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment:
TABLE 2:
Freshwater Ecosystem Services*
Category

Service

Provisioning Services

Drinking, cooking, washing and other household uses;
Manufacturing,
thermoelectric
cooling
power
generation and other industrial uses; Irrigation of
crops, parks, golf courses, etc; Fish and Aquaculture;
Waterfowl; Clams and mussels; Pelt; Medicines and
bioengineering; Hydroelectric generation.

Regulating Services

Pollution dilution and Water Quality Control;
Protection from soil erosion, siltation and natural
hazard mitigation; Regulation of hydrological flows
(buffer runoff, soil water infiltration, groundwater
recharge, maintenance of base flows); Climate
regulation.

Cultural Services

Transportation; Recreation (Swimming, Boating, etc);
Landscape aesthetics; Cultural, artistic and spiritual
uses;

Supporting Services

Wildlife habitat (plants and animals); Soil fertilization;
Flow regime required to maintain downstream habitat
and uses; Water cycling.

171. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 76.
172. Id. at 77.
*
Adapted from Sandra Postel &Stephen Carpenter, FRESHWATER ECOSYSTEM
SERVICES, IN NATURE’S SERVICES 196 (G. C. Daily ed. 1997); MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM
ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: SYNTHESIS ii 40, Box 2.1 (2005); and
Dolf de Groot et al., PAY: ESTABLISHING PAYMENTS FOR WATERSHED SERVICES 16 (IUCN
2008) (2006), available at http://data.iucn.org/dbtw-wpd/edocs/2006-054.pdf.
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3. Threats to Freshwater Ecosystems
Within a watershed, the temperature, quality, quantity and timing of
water draining and flowing in the stream is affected by the local geology,
topography, type of soil, vegetation cover and, above all, human
interference. Despite the valuable range of services provided by freshwater
ecosystem services, these ecosystems are under pressure and are among
those most altered in the past fifty years.173 More than fifty percent of
wetland in parts of North America, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand were
converted to other uses during the twentieth century.
The drivers of change were classified by the Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment as direct and indirect. The primary indirect drivers of
degradation and loss have been population growth and increasing economic
development.174 As human populations and individual well-being have
increased, so has the consumption of ecosystem services. Human
population growth and the human need for food, water, energy, and raw
materials are among the prime pressures placed upon ecosystems. More
advanced and sophisticated technologies that increase the ability to extract
natural resources, as well as highly consumptive lifestyles, just make the
situation worse, depleting resources and increasing the pollution of sinks.175
Water is the “raw material” for many activities that are considered drivers of
economic development. In addition, the disproportionality in patterns of
consumption explored above makes the case for overconsumption in many
places.
According to the Millennium Assessment, the direct drivers of change
in freshwater ecosystem services can be classified as land use choices,
pollution, unsustainable withdrawals, diversion of resources, invasive
species and climate change. 176 These drivers of change not only affect the
quality and quantity of water available for human needs, they also
significantly affect ecosystems and the services they provide.
a. Land Use Choices
Changes in the landscape to increase food production or allow
development can modify the entire water cycle, because such changes
determine the dynamics on the surface of the land and determine the

173.
174.
175.
176.
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relationship between green and blue water.177 Land cover changes affect the
proportion of green to blue water flow and the proportion of fast-flowing
surface storm runoff and slow slowing groundwater recharge feeding
rivers.178 Common causes of habitat loss can be linked to conversion to
urban environments, tourist resorts, ports, harbors, or any other form of
infrastructure development, reservoirs and agricultural lands.179
b. Water Withdrawal
Water is not distributed evenly around the globe, and in some places
the rate and speed at which it has been withdrawn have led to falling water
tables and saltwater intrusion.180 In some dry regions water has been
withdrawn from fossil aquifers where the rate of recharge is so slow that
such withdrawals constitute “water-mining, one time extraction from a
depletable resource.”181 Regions that face severe water scarcity, such as
Saudi Arabia and Northern Africa, are those who have been withdrawing
fossil aquifers.182 Crops produced with mined waters gives the false sense of
food security, because this production is obviously not sustainable.183 The
toll paid for mismanaged diversion and large withdrawals consists of
declining and contaminated aquifers, waterlogged and salted lands,
shrinking lakes184 and rivers running dry, destruction of habitats, and loss of
biodiversity. The most striking example is that of the Aral Sea, where large
scale irrigation canals diverted water for the production of high intensivewater crops from two major rivers that used to drain into the Aral.185 The
reduction of the inflow led to an increase in salt, fertilizer and pesticide
concentrations in the water, and to a rapid shrinking of the lake by
approximately eighty percent in volume of water until a point when the Lake
separated in two parts: the Northern Aral Sea and the Southern Aral Sea.186

177. MAUSER, supra note 74, at 77-78.
178. FALKENMARK, supra note 17, at 2044.
179. ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING, supra note 2, at 835.
180. This problem is particularly acute in the North China Plain, which has
been pumping groundwater at unsustainable levels, threatening not only future
development and survival but also China’s wetlands. See GLEICK ET AL., supra note 85,
at 85-86. The same dynamic holds true in India. See POSTEL, supra note 106, at 59.
181. POSTEL, supra note 106, at 59.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 58.
185. MAUSER, supra note 74, at 37-43.
186. Id.

225

West

Northwest, Vol. 18, No. 1, Winter 2012

Huge amounts of money and effort have been put in place to save the
Northern Aral Sea, while the Southern Aral Sea is predicted to disappear in
approximately ten years.187
c.

Pollution

Despite technological advances in pollution control, as well as
increased regulation, pollution is likely to continue to increase in the future
as a result of economic development driven by urbanization, industries and
intensive agriculture systems.188 Pollution typically refers to chemicals or
other substances in concentrations greater than would occur under natural
conditions, and includes microbes, nutrients, heavy metals, organic
chemicals, oil and sediments and heat.189 Although we usually think of water
pollution as man-made or man-induced, it can also occur naturally as
well.190 Pollutants in water bodies are usually classified and regulated as
“point source pollution” (from pipelines and other identifiable sources), and
nonpoint-source pollution (from stormwater runoff).191 Perhaps the major
water pollution problem to date is eutrophication, defined as excessive
nutrients caused mainly by agricultural runoff, animal manure and domestic
sewage.192
d. Water Diversion
The main form of water diversion is through the construction of Dams.
“[D]ams are perhaps the human induced change that has had the most
adverse overall impact on freshwater ecosystems.”193 They disrupt the water
flow vital to the health of a watershed, block pathways for migratory species
and fish, and change the temperature of the water, making the environment
unsuitable for many species.194

187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING, supra note 2, at 136.
Id.
JEFFREY G. MILLER, ANN POWERS AND NANCY L. ELDER, INTRODUCTION TO
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON WATER POLLUTION CONTROL 2 (2008).
191. ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING, supra note 2, at 136.
192. Id. at 138.
193. NAGLE & RUHL, supra note 6, at 590.
194. UNESCO-WWAP, Water in a Changing World, The United Nations World
Water Development Report 3 (2009) at 129, 149, 153.
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e. Invasive Species
Invasive species are not native to a particular ecosystem, which are
taken beyond their natural setting, either intentionally or unintentionally,
and invade other ecosystems. They might be flora or fauna, and they usually
adversely affect native species and habitats because they compete with
native species for food, water, physical space and other conditions essential
to the survival of the native species.195 Examples of aquatic invasive species
are: zebra mussels, Chinese mitten crabs, hydrilla, Eurasian watermilfoil,
nutria, sea lamprey, Asian carp, and New Zealand mudsnail.196 Some
species might cause small effects, while the effects caused by other species
can be disastrous.
f.

Climate Change

Climate change is expected to exacerbate all of these existing
pressures, thereby increasing the loss and degradation of many inland water
systems.197 It is expected to drive changes in rainfall patterns, causing either
more droughts or more floods than seen to date.198 The benefit from
increased precipitation in some places can be outmatched by deleterious
effects from floods, droughts and climate extreme variability. Where the
climate becomes drier, the most obvious effect is water scarcity due to less
precipitation and increased evaporation. Changes in water temperature and
flow are likely to change the entire aquatic ecosystem. The effects of climate
change on water quality are less understood than its effects on water
quantity, but there are definite connections between climate change and
pathogens.199 An increase in waterbody temperatures may lead to more
algal and bacterial blooms, which in turn lead to lower dissolved oxygen

195. ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING, supra note 2, at 835.
196. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Fisheries and Habitat Conservation,
http://www.fws.gov/fisheries/ans/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2010).
197. According to the IPCC’s definition, climate change “refers to any change
in climate over time, whether due to natural variability or as a result of human
activity.” R. K. Pachauri and A. Reisinger, IPCC, 2007: Climate Change 2007: Synthesis
Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland 30 (2007).
198. Id.
199. UNESCO-WWAP, Water in a Changing World, The United Nations World
Water Development Report 3 (2009) at 70.
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concentrations.200 In addition, the water table is likely to lower, causing salt
intrusion and negatively affecting prairie loopholes and wetlands.201
Rising global temperatures will influence the snowpack formation in
many places and likely affect the water supply during spring snowmelt,
letting streams flow dry earlier in summer. At the same time, an increase in
temperatures is likely to increase the rate of snow melting in other places,
causing spring floods and negatively affecting Arctic ecosystems.202 The
melting of this ice sheet may also release a huge amount of methane
trapped in Iceland, thereby increasing the amount of greenhouse gases in
the atmosphere manifolds and affecting humans and ecosystems
worldwide.203 As modern societies withdraw, divert, pollute or otherwise
impair freshwater ecosystems, they limit the quantity or the capacity of
these ecosystems to provide the services upon which they depend. The
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment reported that the capacity of ecosystems
to provide clean and reliable sources of water is in decline in many parts of
the world.204

III. Payments for Ecosystem Services
A. Challenges in Designing a Policy for Ecosystem Service
Protection
When we think about how water resources and healthy ecosystems are
vital for life support and welfare, we wonder why rational human beings,
acting consciously, take measures that lead to environmental degradation
and ecosystem service loss. The reasons for this behavior can be linked to
our partial knowledge of the links between the structure and function of
ecosystem services and their complexity, the nature of public goods of most
of these services, and our undervaluation of them. In addition, human
beings do not always react rationally and have a hard time making
concessions and sacrifices in the present to avoid future losses.

200. HEATHER COOLEY, WATER MANAGEMENT IN A CHANGING CLIMATE, in GLEIK ET AL.,
THE WORLD’S WATER 2008-2009: THE BIENNIAL REPORT ON FRESHWATER RESOURCES 9, 15
(Peter H. Gleick ed., 2009).
201. Pachauri and Reisinger, supra note 191, at 33.
202. Id. at 31.
203. SUSAN Q. STRANAHAN, MELTING ARCTIC OCEAN RAISES THREAT OF “METHANE TIME
BOMB”, Yale Environment 360, October 30, 2008 at http://e360.yale.edu/content/
feature.msp?id=2081.
204. ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING, supra note 2, at 832.
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Complexity of the Problem and Lack of Knowledge

As already explored in Chapter 2, ecosystem services are ecologically,
geographically and economically much more complex than any other kind of
commodity or service traded in the marketplace.205 Not only is the subject
complex, but our understanding of the dynamics between structures and
functions is in its infancy and this lack of knowledge is a barrier for the
identification and promotion of many ecosystem services.206 We can make
general predictions on the effects of actions on a gross scale, such as the
detrimental effects of clear cutting upon water quality and quantity, but we
cannot predict with certainty how minor specific local actions affect the
delivery of ecosystem services.207
If the scientific community faces
challenges due to the complexity of the topic, the general public’s ignorance
with regards to ecosystem services can also be blamed on the modern
society’s dissociation of technology and natural processes and functions.208
In addition, tension can exist between various ecosystem services,
where the increased productivity of some services might collide with the
delivering of others.209 A classical example can be drawn from a carbon
sequestration project based on a large scale monoculture plantation. While
it might indeed sequester carbon, it also negatively impacts biodiversity and
creates opportunities for increased pests and diseases which might affect
water bodies and soil due to increased use of pesticides.210
2. Public Goods
Public goods are those enjoyed in common; their use by one person
does not preclude their use by others. Subsequently, they are considered
non rival and nonexcludable in consumption.211 In contrast, goods which,
when used by one person, preclude their use by others (i.e., goods that are
excludable and rival in consumption), are generally called private goods and

205. See supra note 51.
206. See supra note 55.
207. James Salzman, Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services: Notes from the Field, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 880 (2005).
208. James Salzman, A Field of Green? The Past and Future of Ecosystem Services, 21 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 133, 134 (2006).
209. Thompson, supra note 42, at 473.
210. FOREST TRENDS ET AL., PAYMENTS FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: GETTING STARTED: A
PRIMER 12 (2008).
211. EBAN S. GOODSTEIN, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 39 (5th ed. 2008).
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are allocated by markets or quasi-market processes.212 There are also goods
that are nonexcludable but rival, and goods that are excludable but nonrival
in consumption.213 Water withdrawals for households, agriculture, industrial
purposes, and commodity goods such as fish, tend to be rivalrous and
excludable in their uses, while water for recreation, aesthetic purposes or
wildlife habitat is largely nonrivalrous and nonexcludable.214 Water quality,
however, can be nonexcludable but rival in consumption because although
no one can be prevented from enjoying clean water, clean water
consumption by one might prevent others from its use.215
The characteristic of public good of most ecosystem services subjects
them to both over-consumption and under-production.216 In 1968 the
famous ecologist, Garrett Hardin coined the termed “tradgey of the
commons.”217 In his seminal paper Tradegy of the Commons on the work of the
overexploitve nature of society and public goods, Hardin explained that
individuals acting individually in their self-interest will try to maximize their
individual gains, overexploiting the common resources, even though it
eventually leads to a collective disaster.218 The most common problem
related to ecosystem services, however, is what J. B. Ruhl calls the “Tragedy
of Ecosystem Services — a case of under-production that happens because
mechanisms are missing for rewarding investments in natural capital that
produce ecosystem services.”219 This is a situation wherein beneficiaries or
buyers of goods and services have no incentive to pay suppliers, because an
action taken or cost shouldered by one individual will benefits others that
cannot be excluded.220 As a result, everyone either waits for someone else to
take the initiative or try to “free ride” on someone else’s action. Providers in
turn have no incentive to supply these ecosystem services, since they are

212. ROBERT A. YOUNG, DETERMINING THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF WATER: CONCEPTS AND
METHODS 6 (2005).
213. NATASHA LANDELL-MILLS & INA PORRAS, SILVER BULLET OR FOOLS’ GOLD? A
GLOBAL REVIEW OF MARKETS FOR FOREST ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES AND THEIR IMPACTS ON THE
POOR 8 (2002).
214. Young, supra note 218, at 7.
215. Stefanie Engel, Stefano Pagiola & Sven Wunder, Designing Payments for
Environmental Services in Theory and Practice: an Overview of the Issues, 65 ECOLOGICAL ECON.
663, 666 n. 8 (2008).
216. Ruhl, Kraft & Lant, supra note 11, at 294.
217. GARRETT HARDIN, THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
218. Id.
219. Ruhl, Kraft & Lant, supra note 11, at 294.
220. Id.
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not rewarded for doing so.221 This lack of reward that is likely to cause the
under-production of these services is called an “externality” by
economists.222
3. Externalities
Externalities can be classified as negative or positive. Pollution is a
classic example of a negative externality; a situation where the full cost of
pollution or other form of environmental degradation is not borne by the
producer or consumer of that specific activity.223 In opposition to negative
externalities, positive externalities do not result in “fully remunerated
contribution towards a public good.”224 A classic example of a positive
externality is a native forest that provides several ecosystem services such as
carbon sequestration, climate stabilization, water filtration, and biodiversity
habitat. None of these services are remunerated or have exact market
values because they are mostly public goods. Instead, things such as timber
and agriculture products, which are both activities that require changes in
land management, have market value. Markets typically fail to remunerate
these services due to the absence of property rights or other legal means to
require payment for the services rendered.225 As a result governments step
in to correct these “market failures” and ensure the supply of these public
goods.226 Governments in turn have their own constraints, such as budgets
deficits, high transaction costs, imperfect knowledge and bureaucracy.227
4. Lack of Signal Prices and Valuation
The absence of markets for public goods leads to the lack of a price
mechanism to signal the scarcity or degradation of ecosystem services. Any
time policy makers and administrators decide how to allocate or protect
resources they make decisions that involve trade-offs. These kinds of
decisions are mostly economic decisions based on the value society assigns

221. Ruhl, Kraft & Lant, supra note 11, at 294.
222. Id.
223. Goodstein, supra note 217, at 32.
224. Jan Keppler, Public Goods, Infrastructure, Externalities and Subsidies: A conceptual
Framework for the “IEA Questionnaire on Government Interventions in the Energy Sector” in
OECD, Subsidies and Environment: Exploring the Linkages 195 (1996).
225. Landell-Mills & Porras, supra note 219 at 7.
226. To correct these market failures, government can adopt different
approaches, which are briefly described below in Chapter 6.
227. Landell-Mills & Porras, supra note 219 at 9.
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to these resources. Simply stated, the value of an ecosystem service is how
much it is worth to society and how much society would forego in exchange
for the delivery of this service.
Edward Farnworth and Walter Westman, pioneers in the field of
ecological economics, stressed the gap between ecologists and economists
when assigning a value to ecosystem services.228 While economists utilize
private market and nonmarket methods to estimate the value of goods and
services in monetary terms, ecologists are adamantly opposed to this
approach and defend the intrinsic value of nature.229 Behind these methods
of valuation lays a philosophical choice. Biocentric advocates assert that
natural resources have an intrinsic value, meaning that species and other
natural beings have intrinsic rights to exist and prosper, regardless of their
ascribed economic value.230 Under the intrinsic theory of value, a service or
good has a value in itself, not as a means to achieve something else. The
value of goods and services is not a function of its utility made by personal
judgments, therefore, any attempt to monetarily quantify what is
intrinsically valuable is destined to fail. On the other hand, there are
anthropocentric utilitarian advocates who argue that natural resources are
valuable only insofar as they are useful to human beings.231 According to
this theory the value of natural resources derives from the utility they
provide to humankind, called an instrumental value. This utility is
interpreted broadly, to encompass not only actual or potential direct use value
such as the consumption of natural goods or recreational activities but also
indirect use value of natural resources such as the nutrient cycle that sustains
the food chain232 and nonuse values. Nonuse values derive from the value that
people assign to something based solely on knowing that it exists, even if
they will never see it or experience it.233
Putting an economic value on ecosystem services is not that simple
because of the complexity of the links between structure, function, and
derived ecosystem services. Making the translation from ecosystem
structure and function to ecosystem services is difficult because the causal

228. Edward G. Farnworth et al., The Value of Natural Ecosystems: An Economic and
Ecological Framework, 8 ENVTL. CONSERVATION 275, 275 (1981).
229. Id.
230. Laurence H. Goulder & Donald Kennedy, Valuing Ecosystem Services:
Philosophical Bases and Empirical Methods in Daily, supra note 16, at 26.
231. Id. at 24.
232. Id. at 25.
233. Id. at 25.
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relationship between them is neither linear nor straightforward.234 The
complexity and variability of ecosystems also makes it difficult to develop
models with broad and universal application.235 In addition, most ecosystem
services are public goods and, therefore, not allocated by markets. The
market price is the simplest and most common valuation method for goods
and services, but since ecosystem services have no market price, economists
developed alternative tools. These tools are described below in section C.
5. Discount Rate
The economic value of an asset, in this case ecosystem services, is the
willingness to pay and willingness to accept,236 for outcomes that might
accrue in the future. This requires spending money today to receive benefits
in the future. However, because these investments have an opportunity cost
today, such as the interest rates, the benefit is worth more today than in the
future.237 Economists, thus apply a discount rate to convert to future values
from the present. This is called the social discount rate and refers to the
rate at which society as a whole is willing to trade the present for the
future.238 In addition, economists have observed that the “time preference”
reveals that individuals reveal a widespread desire to consume today rather
than save for tomorrow.239 Consequently, benefits received at present are
worth more than benefits received in the future.
Setting the appropriate discount rate for environmental policies is a
heated debate. For example, the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate
Change has been both backed and criticized due to the low discount rate
applied.240 Overall, the higher the discount rate that is applied, the less

234. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 2.
235. Thompson, supra note 42, at 471.
236. WTP is the amount an individual or group is willing to pay to secure the
change. To access this value, economists gather information generated by market
transactions that signalizes how much society is willing to pay in order to enjoy that
particular service or good. WTA is captured by observed behavior that show how
much society would accept as compensation to do without the good or service. See
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 244.
237. Goodstein, supra note 217, at 98.
238. W. Douglas Shaw, Water Resource Economics and Policy: An Introduction 39
(2005).
239. Goodstein, supra note 217, at 106.
240. Hal R. Varian, Recalculating the Costs of Global Climate Change, THE NEW
YORK TIMES, Dec. 14, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/14/
business/14scene.html (Last visited on Dec. 16, 2010).
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attractive present investments for the future will be.241
An ethical
consideration that arises here is that the discount rate that will guide
actions or investments affecting future generations is set by the current one.
A political decision that may deplete a natural resource involves the implicit
assumption that future generations will not place as high a value on these
natural resources as current generations place on the chosen depletive
activity.242 Another common assumption is that future generations will be
able to find substitutes or technologies to replace these depleted natural
resources.243 How can we assume that future generations will place a lower
value on ecosystem services than we do currently, or will be much wealthier
in order to offset the losses? The limits of natural capital seem to indicate
that this assumption is wrongheaded.
If solving our current problems of environmental degradation and loss
of ecosystem services is also a matter of better policy choices and
management, applying the appropriate discount rate is likely to play an
important role. There is no simple rule for choosing the discount rate to
compare present and future costs and benefits.244 Development of different
scenarios with multidisciplinary contributions seems to be a wise path to
follow at this moment. The TEEB Report recommends that “a variety of
discount rates — including zero and negative rates, may be used depending
on the nature of the assets being valued, the time period involved, the
degree of uncertainty, and the scope of the project or policy being
evaluated.”245 Barton H. Thompson points out that behind the discussion of
which rate of discount to apply lies the fear that people have difficulty in
making any sacrifice in order to avoid uncertain future losses, and the
tendency to not only minimize future risks but also to optimistically believe
they will be better in the future in order to avoid, reduce, or ameliorate the
risks.246

241. Goodstein, supra note 217, at 100.
242. Farnworth, supra note 234, at 275.
243. Goodstein, supra note 217, at 107.
244. TEEB, supra note 42, at 26.
245. Id.
246. Barton H. Thompson Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the
Commons, 30 ENVTL LAW 241, 262-65 (2000).
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B. Methods for Estimating the Economic Value of
Ecosystem Services
The economic value of ecosystem services is generally estimated using
the so-called total economic value, which includes use and nonuse values.247
Although the terminology may vary slightly, economists classify values as i)
direct use value; (ii) indirect use value; (iii) option value; and (iv) nonuse
value. 248 The first three are generally referred to as use value.249 Direct use
value comprises goods and services that are used consumptively such as
food, timber, water, etc., or nonconsumptively, such as recreational and
cultural activities.250 Indirect use values usually comprise regulating services
such as carbon sequestration and water filtration. Option value is the value
people place on protecting nature for future use by oneself or by
others/heirs, for ethical reasons, and this might include provisioning,
regulating or cultural services.251 Nonuse values, also known as existence
value or passive use value, are those values unrelated to use and include the
value that is assigned to something by simply knowing that it exists even if
this resource or place is never used or experienced.252
To measure changes in welfare and capture the total economic use and
non use value of ecosystem services economists rely primarily on two
alternative ways: willingness to pay (“WTP”) and willingness to accept
(“WTA”).253 Although it was expected that WTP and WTA for the same good
or service would be quite similar, empirical studies have already
demonstrated that there might be great differences between them.254 The
National Research Council suggests that:
Usually, the willingness-to-accept method, which is not
constrained by income, yields a greater value for an improvement
than does the willingness-to-pay measure. Economic theory
suggests that willingness to accept is appropriate for valuing the
removal of a service to which people have a right, whereas

247. Young, supra note 218 at 40.
248. The World Bank, TNC and IUCN, How Much is an Ecosystem Worth? Assessing
the Economic Value of Conservation 9 (2004), available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/external/
worldbank/worldbank-es-value-01-en.pdf.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 9-10.
251. Id. at 10; TEEB, supra note 42, at 63.
252. The World Bank, supra note 254, at 10.
253. See supra note 220.
254. Young, supra note 218, at 29.
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willingness to pay is appropriate for valuing the provision of a
new service or more of an existing service in a situation where
there is no right to receive this service.255
Since most ecosystem services have no market price that could
indicate willingness to pay or accept, they are set using nonmarket methods
through revealed and stated preferences. In some rare circumstances,
benefit transfer methods can also be applied.256 Some methods of valuation
fit better when evaluating ecosystem services that present public good
characteristics, while private good services are usually best served by other
methods, and some approaches can be applied to both.257 The purpose of
this chapter is to present the main economic methods that are applied in
ecosystem valuation and its basic concepts.
1. Revealed and Stated Preference Methods
Revealed preference methods aim to infer the economic value of
ecosystem services from observed behaviors.
a. Market Price Method
Mainstream economic theories argue that the value of goods and
services “rest on the underlying demand and supply relationships that are
usually, but not always, reflected in market prices.”258 Markets are believed
to allocate resources in the most efficient way, since this theory presumes
that economic efficiency is the primary goal of society259 because essentially
it is what brings the greatest happiness to the greatest number of people.260
The theory proposes that markets allocate goods and services from the
lowest and worst to the highest and best economic use, assuming the best
use is the most efficient and does not take into account matters of equity or
fairness.261 Those resources that are traded in the marketplace have a
market price that reflects the consumer’s willingness to pay for the
resources, which is essentially the demand for that output. When
consumers make choices among different and alternative uses, or

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
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opportunities,262 of scarce resources they reveal preferences and the
economic value is the sum of all consumers’ willingness to pay in that
market.263 The economic value is determined by utilizing standard economic
techniques for measuring the economic benefits from marketed goods,
based on the quantity people purchase at different prices, and the quantity
supplied at different prices.264, 265
b. Travel Cost Method
Some ecosystem services, such as aesthetic views and recreational
experiences, may not be directly bought and sold in markets. Hence, this
method gathers data from the costs of traveling to a particular destination
for recreational, aesthetic and cultural purposes, and the time and cost to
travel represent the willingness to pay. The basic travel cost method
assumes that changes in behavior due to increasing costs of traveling
correspond to changes in demand due to an increase in entrance fees,
creating a demand curve from which willingness to pay can be derived.266
This method presents several challenges despite being a method in which
environmental economists have the most confidence.267 Questions include:
How to measure the cost of travelling? Whether to include the
transportation time in the total cost of traveling or treat it as another
variable? How to measure the opportunity cost?268 How to account for
substitute sites or handle multiple purpose trips?269 If an ecosystem change
affects recreational fishing through a change in fish quantity or quality, for
example, the value of the impact (decrease) on recreational fishing can be
estimated using the travel-cost approach. This method, however, would not

262. Opportunity use are the best next alternative for a particular resources
and opportunity costs are the benefits forgone for using this resource for one
purpose instead of the best next alternative. See Young, supra note 218, at 34.
263. Id.
264. See Dennis King and Marisa Mazzotta, Market Price Method. Ecosystem
Valuation (2002), available at http://www.ecosystemvaluation.org/market_price.htm.
265. Young, supra note 218, at 108. (Regarding freshwater resources, direct
observation can be done for water rights transactions that are increasingly occurring
in the arid and semi-arid areas of the Western United States, though the “limited
number of actual markets and the wide fluctuation in asset prices [water rights
prices] suggest caution in applying the observed water prices for public planning
purposes.”). Young, supra note 218, at 108.
266. Id. at 121.
267. Id. at 128.
268. Id. at 124.
269. Id. at 128.
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take into consideration the change on other ecosystem services not involved
in that particular recreational activity.270
c.

The Productivity Method

The productivity method, also referred to as production function, is
used to estimate the economic value of ecosystem products or services that
contribute to the production of commercially marketed goods.271 In this
case, ecosystem services are inputs in the production to the extent that they
support or protect the production of other marketed goods,272 and changes
in market prices of the outputs provide value estimates of these services.
d. The Hedonic Pricing Method
The hedonic pricing method is used to estimate economic values for
ecosystem or environmental services that directly affect property values and
is often used to value environmental amenities that affect the price of
residential properties such as air quality and scenic beauty.273 The
assumption is that changes in property values due to the environmental
characteristics found in that particular location provide an estimate of this
characteristic’s values. Regarding water resources, supply or quality of water
are attributes usually recognized and valued by buyers when purchasing a
property.274 The hedonic method usually reflects actual economic behavior
in real estate markets. Although the method provides tools to isolate the
contribution of ecosystem services to the whole value of the property, real
estate might be subject to fluctuations275 or bubbles, as seen recently in the
United States subprime mortgage crisis.
e. Damage and Substitute Cost Method
The damage cost-avoided, replacement cost, and substitute cost
methods are related methods that estimate values of ecosystem services
based on either the cost of avoiding damages due to service loss, the cost of
replacing ecosystem services, or the cost of providing substitute services
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using the best available alternative.276 The premise adopted is that people
will change their behavior or spend money to avoid undesirable outcomes,
incurring the costs of replacement of a particular ecosystem service, or the
cost of the next best alternative. As a result, the avoided cost provides an
estimate of how much this service is worth.277 The assumption is that “a
rational person will adopt a defensive behavior as long as the value of the
damage avoided is greater than the cost of the defensive steps.”278 The
general premise is that the maximum willingness to pay is not greater than
the cost of the damage avoided279 or the cost of that good or service
provided via some other process or technology.280 This method must
assume effective demand for the next best alternative. In other words, it
assumes that this other project or technology would be undertaken in the
absence of the action under consideration.281 This assumption is one of the
major weaknesses of this method, since an alternative project or more
expensive technology can always be conceived, thereby producing a false
estimate of value and net benefits.282 This method also assumes that people
are aware of the harmful impacts and that activities can be undertaken to
avoid or reduce the negative impacts ensuing,283 which raises the classic
problem of imperfect knowledge in market transactions. Two classic
examples of this method’s application are how much it would cost to build a
filtration plant to achieve safe drinking water standards or to stop flooding
and erosion control that forests and wetlands naturally provide.284 The
problem is that some ecosystem services are not really replaceable, such as
climate regulation, and the failure of the Biosphere 2 Project is an exemplary
reminder of this limitation. This method of valuation, however, cannot be
confused with cost-effective analysis that is performed in many decisionmaking processes. Rather, this method provides guidance and information
for this process.
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2. Stated Preference Methods
Stated preference methods aim to infer values through survey
responses, when data obtained from observed behavior that could
theoretically reveal preferences is not available.
a. The Contingent Valuation Method
The contingent valuation method is estimated by asking people, in a
survey, how much they would be willing to pay for specific environmental
services. This type of survey is conducted in a process where respondents
are provided with detailed information regarding the goods or services being
valued, and can be used to estimate economic values for all kinds of
ecosystem and environmental services, both use and nonuse values.285 The
survey can pose a direct question such as “How much would you willing to
pay for X?” Or can be conducted using the iterative bidding, where
respondents are asked if they are willing to pay a specific amount for X. In
the case where there is an affirmative answer, the method continues
increasing the price until the answer is negative. If the initial response is
negative, then the subsequent questions decrease the price until the point
where the answer is affirmative.286 Another approach is that of a payment
card, where respondents are asked to choose a value among several
alternatives, ranging from zero to a very large number.287
Each approach presents pros and cons; yet the contingent valuation
method allows for flexibility and can be used to estimate proposed changes,
in addition to already verified changes in goods or services.288 However, this
method is one of the most susceptible to biases and has suffered criticism
since its first utilization.289 Although contingent valuation method has been
refined since its inception, many challenges remain.290 This method was the
primary approach used by the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (“NOAA”) to estimate nonuse value loss, such as damages to
wildlife caused by the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound in
1989.291 Currently, it is likely to be considered as an alternative to value

285. Young, supra note 218, at 137.
286. Id. at 138.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 137.
289. Id. at 138.
290. Id.
291. Richard T. Carson et al., Contingent Valuation and Lost Passive Use: Damages
from the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 25 ENVTL. AND RESOURCES ECON. 257 (2003).
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damages caused by the British Petroleum oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in
April 2010.
b. The Choice Method
The choice method, like the contingent valuation, is a hypothetical
method that asks people to make choices based on a hypothetical
scenario.292 Unlike contingent valuation that aims to find willingness to pay
based on direct questions of monetary values, the choice method presents
the respondents with several alternatives, each characterized by several
attributes.293 Based on the hypothetical choices or tradeoffs that people
make, values are inferred from statistical analysis.294 Similarly to contingent
valuation, this method can be used to estimate economic values for virtually
any ecosystem or environmental service, and especially nonuse values.
Compared to the contingent valuation method, it provides more details
regarding the respondent’s utility functions.295 At the same time, it poses
more complex questions to respondents and requires a significant statistical
analysis by the individual posing the questions.296
3. Benefit Transfer Method
Benefit transfer method refers to a method where values are estimated
for similar services and goods, in similar contexts, and the results are
transferred to another set of goods or services not actually measured. Benefit
transfer method is usually applied when limitations on time, resources and
perhaps technical skills do not permit a full empirical analysis.297 This is a
common situation in smallscale projects, preliminary assessments or
projects in developing countries.298 Under this approach values inferred
from a study site are transferred to a policy site.299 Despite its advantage as
less expensive and less time consuming the benefit transfer method does
not find consensus among economists as a reliable method. While some
argue that it can provide valid and reliable estimates under certain
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conditions,300 others argue that it is very rare to find similarity in these
conditions.301
4. Which Method Applies?
As shown, the economic values of ecosystem services can be measured
in monetary terms, with varied degrees of accuracy, using various
techniques, since there is no “one size fits all” method. All methods of
ecosystem valuation require time, resources and econometrical skills, to
different degrees. Revealed preference methods are considered more
accurate, because they derive values from actual, observed consumer
behavior in real contexts.302 However, they require a certain number of
social experiments to yield the necessary data, which is not always possible.
Therefore, the number of published environmental valuations based on
revealed preferences is fewer than those using stated preference methods.303
Stated preference methods, on the other hand, can be designed to test
specific hypotheses, and do not rely on natural experiments. Moreover, they
seem to be the only way to obtain nonuse and future proposed policy
values.304
As shown, different methods can be applied, depending on the context
and needs of a given situation. However, the more precise and accurate the
method, the more time and resource consuming it can be. In addition, it
can be argued that the greater the income and wealth, the greater the
willingness to pay.305 Assigning values based on equally aggregated
individual willingness to pay and to accept may lead to different results for
the same goods and services, for reasons of different wealth and income,
which raises issues of equity and environmental justice. As a result,
corrections or additional elements must be considered in the decisionmaking process.
Many authors argue that in a PES scheme, full economic valuation of
ecosystem services or opportunity costs is not required, yet it can set a price
range and predetermine whether a PES scheme is economically feasible.306
300. Mark L Plummer, Assessing Benefit Transfer for the Valuation of Ecosystem Services
(2009), 7 Frontiers in Ecology and the Envir. 38, (Feb. 2009).
301. Id. at 40.
302. Young, supra note 218 at 156. Id.
303. Id.
304. Shaw, supra note 222, at 254; Young, supra note 218, at 157.
305. National Research Council, supra note 19, at 88.
306. Sven Wunder, The Efficiency of Payments for Environmental Services in Tropical
Conservation, 21 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 48, 53-54 (2007).
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Indeed, economic valuation is not an end in itself but a means to provide
information that can be used to make better choices concerning ecosystem
service management. The extent to which economic valuation will be
conducted depends on the context of the services being provided and the
resources available.

C. The Policy Toolbox
To address environmental problems with such degrees of complexity,
there is no silver bullet307 or one size fits all308 solution; rather a combination
of approaches is required. The solution calls for what professor Barton H.
Thompson calls “governance of the commons,”309 which encompasses
governmental intervention, economic incentives and political support.
Where several different market failures coexist, different instruments must
be combined.310 The toolkit applied is labeled by Professor James Salzman
as the five Ps: prescriptive regulation, property rights, penalties, payments,
and persuasion.311
1. Command and Control
Prescriptive regulation, also called command and control, is the most
common and widely used mechanism to achieve environmental
protection.312 In simple terms, it sets a goal and prescribes mandatory,
allowed, and forbidden actions to achieve it, and imposes penalties for noncompliance. Because the regulated community shoulders the burden
equally, this mechanism is said to be less flexible than market-based

307. Silver bullet is a metaphor used to describe a straightforward and
effective solution, one used by Landell-Mills and Porras to describe a solution to
tackle economic social and environmental problems. See Landell-Mills and Porras,
supra note 219.
308. See Kenneth R. Richards, Framing Environmental Policy Instrument Choice, 10
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 221, 225-26 (2000) (“The optimal choice of policy instrument
to implement a particular pollution abatement goal depends upon the nature of the
pollutant, the kind of harm the pollutant causes, the available control technologies,
the number and type of polluting entities, and the type of market failure. In short,
when it comes to environmental policy instrument choice, one size does not fit all.”).
309. Barton H. Thompson Jr., supra note 230, at 266.
310. Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, supra note 205 at 669.
311. James Salzman and Barton H. Thompson Jr., Environmental Law and Policy
47 (3rd ed. 2010).
312. Id.
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mechanisms.313 Under this mechanism, the two approaches commonly used
to deal with environmental pollution are uniform technology-based and
performance-based standards.314 While technology-based standards require
a particular technology to be used, performance-based standards set a
specific goal but do not specify the means to achieve this goal.315 Variants of
prescriptive regulation traditionally used to address conservation of
biodiversity are the establishment of strictly protected areas, Integrated
Conservation and Development Projects (“ICDP”), and sustainable forest
management; the latter two are considered a more indirect approach to
conserve biodiversity316 and a mechanism for poverty alleviation.317 The idea
of protecting areas underpinned the creation of the National Parks system in
the United States and inspired similar initiatives worldwide.318 While the
creation of protected areas necessarily implies removing people from the
area and forbidding any kind of human impact, ICDP are usually referred to
as projects that seek to integrate development and conservation concerns,
applying holistic efforts that comprise building local institutional capacity to
obtain local goodwill toward conservation and influence government
policies.319
2. Economic Incentives
Another type of mechanism to address environmental problems is
incentive-based policies. As the name suggests, this policy uses incentives
(mostly economic incentives) to drive behaviors toward the policy goal. An
economic incentive program can be defined as “any program that provides
an economic benefit for pollution reductions or an economic penalty for
pollution.”320 As a result, economic incentive programs include either

313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Robert W. Hahn and Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental
Regulation: A New Era from and Old Idea? 18 Ecology L. Q. 1, 5-6 (1991).
316. Paul Ferraro and Agness Kiss, Direct Payments to Conserve Biodiversity, 298 Sci.
1718 (2002).
317. Wunder, supra note 23, at 20.
318. Brent M. Swallow et al., Compensation and Rewards for Environmental Services in
the Developing World: Framing Pan-Tropical Analysis and Comparison, 14 ECOLOGY AND SOCIETY
26 (2009).
319. Wunder, supra note 23, at 6.
320. The author uses pollution reduction as the environmental goal but the
incentive-based design can be used for any other environmental goal. David M.
Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?: Replacing the Command and
Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289, 323 (1998).
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positive or negative incentives. The OECD Report labels policy instruments
as economic instruments when “they affect estimates of costs and benefits
of alternative actions open to economic agents,” classifying them as: charges
and taxes, subsidies, tradeable emission permits, and deposit-refund
systems.321 Another category can be added to this list: certification or
labeling programs.
Environmental taxes and charges322 rely on making environmental
pollution expensive and thus, forcing polluters to internalize the previously
external pollution cost, up to the point where the marginal cost of
controlling this pollution equals the tax or fee charged.323 In this context,
the overall cost of achieving a given pollution control target will be
minimized, because those with lower marginal abatement costs will abate
emissions more than polluters with higher costs.324 When set at an
appropriate level, taxes provide a permanent incentive to adopt less
polluting (or environmentally degrading) activities.325
However, this
approach puts a price on pollution but does not limit the amount that will
be generated. As a result, it is blamed for being uncertain regarding the
level of pollution control that will be achieved.326
Subsidies, broadly defined, are “public payments which directly benefit
the private production or consumption of goods and services. They are
justified in political decision-making by the real or presumed existence of
positive side-effects generated by these activities which warrant higher level
of production that would prevail in the absence of such subsidies.”327 They
aim to transfer benefits and adopt measures that benefit society as a
whole328 and can be done through grants, soft loans or tax allowances.329

321. Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD),
Evaluating Economic Instruments for Environmental Policy 15 (1997).
322. Environmental taxes are compulsory, unrequited payments to general
government using as a tax base something that has a proven negative impact on the
environment when used or released. Charges are compulsory requited payments,
although the payment is not always proportional to the service rendered. See
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), Environmental
Taxes and Green Tax Reform 18 (1997).
323. Hahn and Stavins, supra note 292, at 8.
324. OECD, supra note 299, at 18.
325. Id.
326. Hahn and Stavins, supra note 292, at 8.
327. Jan Keppler, supra note 209, at 193.
328. Stephen Barg, Eliminating Perverse Subsidies: What’s the Problem? in OECD,
supra note 209, at 29.
329. OECD, supra note 298, at 17.
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A deposit-refunds system is a surcharge laid on the price of potentially
polluting products that is refunded as the pollution is avoided by returning
these products to a collection system.330 Certification programs are those
that track the entire life cycle of products and services, aiming to reduce the
environmental impact on both the supply and production chain and attract
concerned consumers; carbon labeling is one of the most notorious
examples.331
By using market-based approaches or property right approaches,
commonly known as tradable permit systems or cap-and-trade systems,
governments allocate initial property rights, set the limits of resource
exploitation or pollution, and establish the penalties for noncompliance and
then step back, letting the market allocate this property rights in the most
efficient way. Those who are able to control pollution at a lower cost can
sell their permits to those who cannot do it so efficiently.332 U.S. based
programs such as wetland banking, the Endangered Species Act
conservation bank, and the acid rain program are good examples of markets
created as a result of regulation and the carbon market under the Kyoto
Protocol is the primary example in the international marketplace. Marketbased policies were suggested by economists in the 1960s but were only
widely adopted in the 1990s and are perceived as more efficient and able to
foster innovation when compared to traditional command and control
regulations.333 The theory goes that because polluters have an economic
incentive to reduce their pollution below mandatory levels they will seek out
new technologies, and because regulators do not need to gather information
from the regulated community and choose which technology should be
adopted, leaving the market to decide which will be used, this approach is
more cost effective.334 This policy was criticized for not addressing problems
related to environmental justice and pollution hotspots for trading
commodities that are not really fungible335 and for problems related to

330. Id. at 18.
331. LIFE CYCLE ASSESSMENT RESEARCH AT LIFE CYCLE ASSESSMENT RESEARCH,
http://www.epa.gov/nrmrl/lcaccess/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2010).
332. Hahn & Stavins, supra note 292, at 8.
333. Id. at 12-14; Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard Stewart, Reforming Environmental
Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333-3434 (1985).
334. Goodstein, supra note 217, at 305-06.
335. The Wetland Mitigation Banking program in the United States is a classic
example where the commodities traded have no equivalent functions because acres
of wetlands that are filled can be “mitigated” by the acres of wetlands created off site
with no concern over the productivity or functions performed. Salzman, supra note
198, at 909-10.
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fairness in initial allocation.336 Further, many authors argue that this
costeffectiveness is a myth because prescriptive regulation can indeed
promote innovation and efficiency.337 Indeed, the OECD survey on economic
instruments conducted in 1997 argues that the “ex post” evidence available
so far cannot conclusively prove the efficiency of economic instruments over
regulatory instruments, but in many instances economic instruments have
proven to be effective.338 Nevertheless, the same report argues that the full
effectiveness of economic instruments will only be fully accessed once the
instruments have been in operation for a considerable period of time.339
Professor David Driesen points out that the economic incentive criteria
to differentiate these policies from the traditional command and control is
deceptive because “traditional regulation relies upon a negative economic
incentive — a monetary penalty for noncompliance — as the principle
inducement to comply with regulatory requirements . . .”340 In this sense,
environmental regulation
is all about using incentives to control
behaviors.341 They differ, however, in regard to the type of incentive that can
be positive or negative and the degree of economic incentive used (See
Figure 2).
Taking the above into consideration, it is generally agreed that all
policies require regulation and will be influenced by economic incentives, to
different degrees. To the same extent that markets depend critically on how
legal and judicial systems are set up and are monitored by governments,
government intervention can be improved by “internal markets.”342 It is also
well accepted that the complexity presented by ecosystem services requires
a mixture of different policies where the optimal combination is contextspecific. In the past few years, Payments for Ecosystem Services emerged
as an ally in this battle against ecosystem services loss. Justified under the

336. Plater et al., supra note 135, at 712-34.
337. Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When is Command and Control Efficient?
Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for
Environmental Protection, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 887, 936 (1999); Salzman & Thompson, supra
note 291, at 47. In some cases, prescriptive regulation may provide more overall
economic efficiency than its incentive-based counterpart. See Richards, supra note
288, at 225-26.
338. Smith, Vos & OECD, supra note 298, at 127.
339. Id. at 128.
340. Driesen, supra note 326, at 323.
341. Timothy Malloy, Regulating by Incentive: Myths, Models, and Micromarkets, 80
TEX. L. REV. 531, 531 (2002).
342. Landell-Mills & Porras, supra note 219, at 3.
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“beneficiary pays” principle rather than the “polluter pays” principle,343, 344
PES is an incentive-based mechanism that uses positive incentives to
internalize positive externalities, presenting either a Coasean/Private
agreement345 or a public subsidy characteristic depending on the scheme.346
Although PES can be made through ecosystem markets, they do not
necessarily require an actual market to be traded, and most often lack all
tools and principles that characterize a market transaction.347 Therefore,
although they resemble other policy tools, PES is something new in the big
pool of well tested environmental approaches and presents unique
characteristics that justify a set of principles and guidelines to be tested on
its own terms.348 Instead of presupposing the existence of win-win solutions,
it is a policy mechanism that explicitly recognizes hard trade-offs in land use
options and tries to reconcile conflicting interests.349
There is a lot of confusion about the concept and the elements of PES
since the term has been used as a broad umbrella for any kind of marketbased mechanism adopted for conservation.350 According to Wunder, PES is
the most promising innovation in conservation since the Earth Summit was
held in 1992 in Rio, but it still needs to be tested on a larger and more

343. Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD),
Paying for Biodiversity: Enhancing the Cost-Effectiveness of Payments for Ecosystem Services 27
(2010).
344. Nevertheless, the characterization of a provider of services rather than a
polluter remains one of the most controversial and difficult issues because the harm
prevented and the benefit derived represent two sides of the same coin. Which
principle to apply and therefore which policy adopt — reward or punishment — is
the core of policy design, and the situation on which PES is best suited is explored in
this paper.
345. Engel, Pagiola & Wunder, supra note 205, at 666; Salzman, supra note 198,
at 884 (framing PES much like a business transaction between willing parties).
346. Salzman states that PES might also take the form of a subsidy, either as a
direct payment or a tax break, justified by an argument that, although society at a
large benefits from them, they are not paid for due to a market failure (public good
characteristics). See Salzman, supra note 199, at 138. See also Engel, Pagiola &
Wunder, supra note 205, at 668 (referring to PES as a subsidy from the perspective of
PES recipients).
347. Salzman, supra note 199, at 135-36; Roldan Muradian et al., Reconciling
Theory and Practice: An Alternative Conceptual Framework for Understanding Payments for
Environmental Services, 69 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1202, 1205 (2010).
348. Wunder, supra note 23, at 4.
349. Id. at 1; Wunder, supra note 286, at 49.
350. Engel, Pagiola & Wunder, supra note 205, at 664.
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diverse scale.351 How does PES fit within the policy toolkit? What are the
basic features of PES? Under which circumstances is PES an appropriate
policy? What are the potentials to be explored and concerns to be
addressed? The next chapters will address these questions.

D. Historic development of Payments for Ecosystem
Services
Although the recognition of the role played by ecosystems in life
support systems has been acknowledged since antiquity, they were either
ignored or undervaluated by the general public. Although the idea that
nature’s functions benefit human societies has already been investigated in
the literature,352 the terminology ecosystem services was first adopted in the
report STUDY OF CRITICAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS (1970) and explored by
the work of Mooney and Ehrlich between 1970 and 1983.353 In the same
period, the discipline of ecological economics354 studies was initiated.355 In
the economic realm, this gradual recognition of the role and value rendered
by natural structures and functions was part of a gradual commodification
process of ecosystem services, where they were attributed an exchange
value, rather than only a use value.356 In 1997 the seminal book “Nature’s
Services,” by Gretchen Daily, introduced the theory of ecosystem services
into the mainstream of environmental studies,357 and the release of the
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment in 2003 was a milestone and an eye-

351. Wunder, supra note 23, at 3.
352. Erik Gómez-Baggethun, supra note 34.
353. Mooney & Ehrlich, supra note 15, at 14-15.
354. The first academic community to specialize in this field was the Society of
Environmental and Resource Economics, whose origins date from the 1960s. This
society split in the 1980s between the Environmental Economics and the Ecological
Economics. How exactly they differ remains controversial, but one area of
controversy is related to the sustainability of natural capital. While environmental
economics advocate the “weak sustainability” approach, which assumes
substitutability between natural and manufactured capital, ecological economics
advocates “strong sustainability” which maintains that natural capital and
manufactured capital are in relation of complementarily rather than of one of
substitutability. Another area of controversy is related to ecosystem services
valuation where ecological economists argue that different types of value may not be
expressed in a common measurement unit. Gómez-Baggethun et al., supra note 329.
355. See Chapter 5 and Thompson, supra note 291.
356. Gómez-Baggethun et al., supra note 329.
357. Ruhl, Kraft & Lant, supra note 11, at 6.
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opener for their value and threats, introducing the concept in the policy
agenda.358
The concept of ecosystem services was initially conceived as a
communication tool to demonstrate how the disturbance of ecosystem
functions negatively affects critical services for human beings, but it was
promptly adopted by academics and policymakers.359 As a result, the idea of
using payments as an economic-based policy was adopted as a corollary
pragmatic tool to incorporate the value of ecosystem services into the
decision-making process. Coasean proponents integrated the concept into
market-based mechanisms in order to address the problem of externalities
posed by most ecosystem services.360 Consequently, Markets for Ecosystem
Services (“MES”) and Payments for Ecosystem Services (“PES”) were
developed as policy mechanisms to cash in on these services on market
exchanges.361
As several schemes were introduced and tested it became more
evident how the complexity and scope of ecosystem services limit the
development of markets.362 As critical analyses were developed to assess the
impacts of such markets on poor people,363 a second generation of PES
started to be built which incorporated lessons learned from previous
schemes. Given that a too broad definition did not provide elements to
clearly distinguish PES from other economic incentive initiatives, the initial
concept was reframed.364

E. Conceptual Framework and Classification
There is a substantial and continuing diversity in the conceptualization
of payments for ecosystem services, where some criteria are broader and

358. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, supra note 2.
359. Gómez-Baggethun et al., supra note 329.
360. Muradian et al., supra note 353, at 1209.
361. Gómez-Baggethun et al., supra note 329.
362. Influential publications in the area of PES can be attributed to Barton H.
Thompson Jr., James Salzman, Paul Ferraro and Agnes Kiss, Natasha Landell-Mills
and Ina Porras, Sven Wunder, Stefano Pagiola, and J. B. Ruhl.
363. Landell-Mills & Porras, supra note 219.
364. Ina Porras et al., All that Glitters: a Review of Payments for Watershed Services in
Developing Countries 10, Natural Resource Issues No. 11. International Institute for
Environment and Development. London, U.K. (2008).

250

West

Northwest, Vol. 18, No. 1, Winter 2012

encompass a wide number of arrangements while others are stricter.365
There is also a considerable difference between the theory and the practice
of ecosystem services, as political and cultural realities have a major
influence on the design of the schemes.366 Different terms were used in the
literature to describe the same or similar arrangements,367 but eventually
PES became the most widely used expression.368 Regarding watershed
services, the most common expression used is Payments for Watershed
Services (“PWS”), and the latest comprehensive report on the issue defines it
as “any transaction where there is a payment or exchange of credits between
a buyer and seller to affect some improvement of a watershed service.”369
Since the ideas presented in this section apply to both PES and PWS, the
term PES will be adopted as encompassing PWS, unless otherwise noted.
In their pioneer review of markets for environmental services, LandellMills and Porras defined PES as “any situation where there was a buyer and
a seller of an environmental service.”370 This definition was later reviewed by
Porras in the follow-up report and slightly modified to adopt part of the five
criteria provided by Wunder.371 Indeed, Wunder’s definition is the most
accepted and cited372 and came to fill the gap existing in the literature at that
time.373 Wunder describes PES as “a voluntary transaction where a well
defined ES [environmental service] is being bought by a ES buyer, from a ES

365. Id. at 101. But see also Engel, Pagiola & Wunder, supra note 205, at 664,
(the broad use of the term is a strategic approach adopted by donors and NGOs to
“sell” the projects since the expression “PES” is fashionable).
366. Ina Porras et al., supra note 341, at 101.
367. Apart from the discussion between “ecosystem” and “environmental”
services, there is also another discussion as to the nature of the payments or
rewards. The terms used are: Payments for Environmental Services, Markets for
Environmental Services, Compensation for Environmental Services, and Rewards for
Environmental Services. See Wunder, supra note 23, at 5.
368. Ina Porras et al., supra note 341, at 10.
369. Tracy Stanton et al., State of Watershed Payments: An Emerging Marketplace 2,
http://moderncms.ecosystemmarketplace.com/repository/moderncms_documents/st
ate_of_water_2010.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2010).
370. Ina Porras et al., supra note 341, at 10.
371. The author considers Wunder’s five criteria too restrictive, adopting
instead three criteria: 1) an environmental externality addressed through a payment;
2) a voluntary agreement in principle, in the supply side, and 3) conditionality in
principle. Porras et al., see id. at 14-16.
372. Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, supra note 205, at 664; Arild Vatn, An
Institutional Analysis of Payments for Environmental Services, 69 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1245
(2010); OECD, supra note 320, at 27.
373. Wunder, supra note 23, at 3.
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provider, if and only if the ES provider secures ES provision.”374 According to
Wunder, five criteria must be in place to have a PES scheme, namely: 1)
voluntary transaction; 2) well defined service; 3) buyer; 4) seller; 5)
conditionality. As Wunder points out, very few PES schemes analyzed by
Landell-Mills and Porras375 meet these five criteria, so he labels those
schemes where the five criteria are found as “true PES” and those schemes
where the five criteria are not found as merely “PES-like.”376 Nevertheless, he
argues that it is desirable to convert the latter into the former because these
five criteria represent the PES principles and must be applied when testing
the cases.377 Muradian et al. argue that this definition is based on the Coase
Theorem and does not reflect the bulk of PES being practiced.378 As a result,
this mismatch between theory and practice leads to a flawed concept.379 The
authors argue that the transactions are not voluntary from the buyer’s point
of view, environmental services are not fully designed, and many cases in
developing countries fail to meet the additionality criteria.380 Consequently,
the authors propose that PES should be defined as “a transfer of resources
between social actors, which aims to create incentives to align individual
and/or collective land use decisions with the social interest in the
management of natural resources.”381 Since several schemes fit within this
classification, they could be clustered according to the importance of the
economic incentive, the directness of the transfer, and the degree of
commodification of environmental service.382
The large number and diversity of the so-called PES schemes currently
being practiced drives confusion and different conceptualizations.
Nevertheless, PES as an optional policy is a topic field which requires
coherent analysis and application. This is easier said than done when one
takes into account the novelty of the policy and the complexity of the
subject. However, as observed by Ann Althouse: “Finding a scheme of

374. Id.
375. Id. at 4; Landell-Mills and Ina Porras, supra note 219.
376. Wunder, supra note 23, at 4.
377. Id. at 4, 21.
378. According to this theorem, “as long as transaction costs are low enough
and property rights are clearly defined, individuals, communities and even supranational entities would trade away their rights until a Pareto-efficient provision of
environmental goods and services has been achieved.” Muradian et al., supra note
353, at 1203.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 1205.
382. Id.
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coherence, a framework, really is the process of understanding. To merely
observe that a field is chaotic, arcane or incoherent is to decline the work of
understanding.”383 In order to make the analyses consistent, it is critical to
classify the subject, identifying common and distinctive patterns.
Considering that the definition should be a function of the policy’s goal,
containing what is common and distinctive to other policies, the concept of
PES could be described as a positive incentive to protect or improve an
ecosystem service conditional to the delivery of the service.
Using a carrot, or positive incentive, as a key feature PES is
differentiated from other policies that adopt coercion or negative economic
incentives to drive behaviors. The ultimate goal of the policy is to address
an environmental positive externality that is common to the provision of
most ecosystem services, therefore aiming to protect or enhance the
delivery of these services that are threatened precisely by its character of
positive externality. Either because many PES that are being practiced
around the world are not conditional to the delivery of the service or
because the actual delivery is hard to measure, the conditionality is the
most controversial feature of this policy. Nevertheless, “conditionality is
critical to the definition of PES.”384 Otherwise, there would be no distinction
between government-financed PES and subsidies. In addition, because the
policy goal is to protect or enhance ecosystem services, without genuine
mechanisms that at least attempt to demonstrate delivery, there will be no
means to ensure the policy is effectiveor efficient.

F. Key Elements
1. Positive incentives
Ferraro and Kiss described payments for watershed protection as an
incentive to preserve ecosystems, situated in the middle of the spectrum of
tools to promote conservation and considered a more direct approach than
subsidies for sustainable agriculture (and therefore distinct of subsidies) but
less direct than easements and more effective than indirect approaches such
as ICDP.385 Wunder classifies PES as a policy that most relies on economic
incentives when compared to other policies, presenting more directness in
conservation than environmental taxes and subsidies, which also rely

383. Ann Althouse, Late Night Confessions in the Hart and Wechsler Hotel, 47 VAND. L.
REV. 993, 1001 (1994), cited in Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law as a Legal Field: an
Inquiry in Legal Taxonomy, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 221, 229-30 (2010).
384. Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, supra note 205, at 668.
385. Ferraro and Kiss, supra note 322.
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heavily on economic incentives.386 PES is situated in the northern cluster of
the figure below:
FIGURE 2:
Degrees of Economic Incentive and Directness*

a. Voluntary Transaction
Wunder classifies PES as a voluntary agreement in opposition to
command-and-control measures and stresses that, where providers have no
land use choice, the payment is not voluntary but rather is part of a
command-and control approach.387 Muradian et al. strongly oppose this
characterization, arguing that “a wide variety of schemes depend on State
engagement and therefore are not voluntary market transactions from the
buyer’s point of view” and argue that, in many other cases, the buyers are
not aware of actually paying for ecosystem services when they are charged
for higher water fees.388 So the question is, which characteristics should a
policy present so as to be classified as a voluntary approach?
Seen as a natural evolution of conventional prescriptive command and
control, voluntary agreements were introduced into the public policy debate

386.

Wunder, supra note 23, at 7.
Wunder, supra note 23, at 6.
387. Id. at 3.
388. Muradian et al., supra note 353, at 1203.
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as a means to achieve environmental targets by negotiated agreements.389
The host of benefits propagated by voluntary agreement advocates includes
more flexibility in achieving the environmental goal, more political support,
and reduced conflict between governments and the regulated community
since a consensus is sought.390 At the same time, critics characterize
voluntary agreements as wishful thinking and argue that they can lead to
inferior policy results.391 Voluntary agreements can be made through three
different main instruments: (a) unilateral commitments made by polluters
and communicated to their stakeholders; (b) negotiated agreements
between elements of one sector or group of sectors to meet one or more
overall targets; and (c) public voluntary schemes developed by
environmental agencies, according to standards or targets set by public
authorities.392 While voluntary approaches provide more flexibility in terms
of how to meet the environmental target, setting the appropriate level is
vital for the effectiveness of this policy.393 To the same extent, this flexibility
raises issues related to regulatory capture. Since environmental targets
tend to be set for individual companies or sectors, rather than applied on a
large scale, economic efficiency tends to be low and the costs to negotiate,
prepare, and implement the agreement tend to be high.394 Nevertheless,
without a credible stick, voluntary agreements are unlikely to add any
contribution to the policy toolkit.
Adopting these definitions, PES schemes can fit within negotiated
agreements between elements of one sector or group of sectors to meet one
or more overall targets or within public voluntary schemes developed by
environmental agencies. It is unlikely that they will resemble unilateral
commitments made by polluters and communicated to their stakeholders
because here the goal is not to reward a positive externality and the carrot is
not a reward of cash or in kind. As seen, the common and distinctive feature

389. Dorit Kerret and Alon Tal, Greenwash or Green Gain? Predicting the Success and
Evaluating the Effectiveness of Environmental Voluntary Agreements, 14 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV.
31, 32 (2005).
390. Id. at 32-34.
391. Id. at 34.
392. Environmental Voluntary Approaches: Research Insights for Policy Makers, CENTRE
D’ECONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE (CERNA), 6 (Charles J. Higley & Francois Leveque eds., 2001)
http://www.cerna.mines-paristech.fr/Documents/FLCJH-CAVAPolicyBrief.pdf.
393. Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD),
Voluntary Approaches for Environmental Policy: Effectiveness, Efficiency and Usage in Policy Mixes
PIN CITE (2003).
394. Id.
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of PES is the positive incentive to address an externality rather than a
voluntary approach policy.
b. Subsidies
Salzman and Wunder usually refer to government-financed PES as a
All subsidies are, by definition, voluntary but not all
subsidy.395
environmental voluntary approaches adopted in policy making are
subsidies.396 The opt-in characteristics of PES make them voluntary
agreements but, as seen, voluntariness as a key feature is not the
distinctiveness of PES. Accordingly, are they subsidies?
For a long time and not without reason, subsidies have been linked to
environmental degradation and have faced political opposition. The
political and institutional obstacles for the use of subsidies can include but
are not limited to: (a) no subsidy can be a good subsidy; once a new subsidy
is in place, it will be very difficult to remove it later and therefore is better
not to have it; (b) it is difficult to choose among competing opportunities,
and governments are inadequate when it comes to making the choice as to
when the markets are best suited for this task; (c) subsidies are likely to
contravene international trade rules; and (d) subsidies are inadequate to the
task of promoting their goals.397 Nevertheless, subsidies can also be used
for positive environmental purposes.398
Adopting a common and broad definition, subsidies represent “public
payments which directly benefit the private production or consumption of
goods and services,”399 but the literature provides varied and different
examples which make the definition context specific.400 Nevertheless,
subsidies usually fall within three categories: i) when governments make
direct transfers of funds to producers or consumers or instruct private
parties to do so; ii) when governments provide goods or services at no cost
or below market price; or iii) when regulatory policies create transfers from
one group to another.401 The first two categories were included in the WTO
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures definition of

395. See supra note 323.
396. OECD, supra note 371, at 110.
397. Barg, supra note 305,at 27.
398. Id.
399. Keppler, supra note 209, at 193.
400. World Trade Organization, World Trade Report: Exploring the Links Between
Subsidies, Trade and the WTO 52 (2006).
401. Id. at 48-49.
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subsidies,402 but the most widespread, standardized information on
subsidies is provided by the National Accounts Statistics, which defines
subsidy as “current unrequited payments that government units make to
enterprises on the basis of the level of their production activities or the
quantities or values of the services which they produce, sell or import.”403
Although this definition restricts subsidies to the first category listed
above,404 it would not exclude PES if it were not for the conditionality
element. Since subsidies are unrequited, meaning that no contribution is
expected or received in return,405 they are distinct from PES which are
conditional, despite having many elements of subsidization. Engel et al.,
also stress that subsidies can suffer from lack of additionality and leakage,406
elements that are necessarily required in a PES. As seen, the unique
features of PES confer to them an individual place in the policy toolkit.
c.

Drivers

Watershed protection usually has two general purposes: to secure or
enhance instream flow and/or to reduce pollution. Water quality and
quantity are usually classified as public goods, turning them into a
government concern,407 but they may also present private good or common
good characteristics,408 driving the private sector to step in.
The private sector usually engages in a PES scheme in order to secure
the delivery of a service in a more cost-effective way when compared to the
provision without the PES scheme or to secure the delivery of a service that
is threatened otherwise.409 Governmental regulation is a substantial driver
of payments for watershed protection,410 and certainly regulation is the
major driver of the Water Quality Trading scheme in the United States.411

402. World Trade Organization Analytical Index: Guide to World Trade
Organization Law and Practice, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, art. 1,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/subsidies_
01_e.htm
403. World Trade Organization, supra note 378, at 51.
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. Engel, Pagiola & Wunder, supra note 205, at 668.
407. Thompson, supra note 31, at 293-94.
408. Engel, Pagiola & Wunder, supra note 205, at 667.
409. FOREST TRENDS ET AL., PAYMENTS FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: GETTING STARTED: A
PRIMER 33 (2008).
410. Id. at 36.
411. Stanton et al., supra note 347, at 51.
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Regulation was also the trigger to what became the worldwide famous NYC
Watershed Agreement.
d. The New York City Watershed Agreement
The best known example of payments for watershed protection in the
U.S. is the agreement that involved New York City and several municipalities
in upstate New York to protect the city’s drinking water supplies and avoid
the construction of a filtration system. In 1989, the Safe Drinking Water Act
and the Surface Water Treatment Rule released by the EPA set the stage for
what would be one of the largest payment schemes for watershed
protection.412 According to the rule, any water system using waters from
reservoirs, streams, lakes, and rivers would have to filter those waters unless
they could obtain an exemption.413 The waiver would be issued for those
who could demonstrate that they would be able to protect the water bodies
from contaminants. The strategy to protect the watershed and avoid the
construction of a costly filtration plant (not always proven to be effective)
involved land acquisition, regulation restricting development, and payments
for ecosystem services.414 The whole watershed protection program was
estimated to cost about $1.5 billion, far less than the $4 billion to $8 billion
cost of constructing a filtration plant.415 Obviously, the path to the 1997 New
York City watershed agreement was not smooth. First, there was a huge
outcry from upstate landowners and municipalities regarding the
restrictions imposed on future development. Second, to make the health
and environmental department of New York City push the issue more
aggressively, officials were targets of several law suits and media attention,
led by Robert Kennedy Jr. on behalf of Riverkeepers and sponsored by the
Pace University School of Law Environmental Litigation Clinic.416 It is worth
pointing out that the historic regulatory authority of New York City over
activities in the watershed provided this agreement with unique
characteristics that may not be replicated in other settings.417 Nevertheless,
the 1997 memorandum of agreement was made possible due to, among
other things, extensive negotiations that included several payments for
watershed protection.

412. GRETCHEN C. DAILY & KATHERINE ELLISON, THE NEW ECONOMY OF NATURE: THE
QUEST TO MAKE CONSERVATION PROFITABLE 69 (2002).
413. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1 (b)(7)(C)(i)(v); 40 C.F.R. § 141.71.
414. Thompson, supra note 31, at 301-04.
415. Id. at 299.
416. Daily & Allison, supra note 390, at 70-71.
417. Thompson, supra note 31, at 301.
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Another common reason for engaging in this type of agreement is to
secure value added to output goods and services and improved public
relations.418 Companies that finance PES schemes are usually motivated by
the desire to improve their relationships with the local community and to
give public notice of their environmental consciousness. By doing so, they
can both attract the same sort of consumers, thereby increasing their market
share as well as charging a premium for their products or services.
e. Service Buyers
All users of the services identified in subsection “Freshwater
Ecosystem Services” (Part II subsection C) are potential buyers of ecosystem
services, namely: hydroelectric power producers, water treatment facilities,
industrial (particularly food and drink, drugs, cosmetics, energy, and mining
industries), agricultural, transportation and tourism sector, and even
individuals. Where it is viable to identify users and make them pay for the
service, then we have a user-financed program. Users will be likely to
engage in a PES scheme when either (a) the scheme benefits a small
number of actors so the transaction costs and incentives for freeriding are
low or (b) if users have sufficiently large benefits that justify bearing all the
costs and freeriding on the effort of others would be an unrealistic option.419
An example of the latter situation would be the benefits accrued by
hydroelectric power plants that justify the payments despite others
potentially being able to freeride on the same benefits.420 Therefore, the
conditions required for the implementation of a user-financed scheme are
related to i) property rights clearly defined and enforced, ii) low transaction
costs, or iii) situations with local monopsonies or oligopsonies because they
tend to lower the transaction costs and override the freerider and collective
action problem.421 These programs are considered user-financed programs,
as opposed to government-financed programs, where governments not only
pay the bill but also have the authority and discretion to make the
agreement and the payments.422 According to Salzman, monopsonies
explain part of the success of PES introduced in the U.S. based New York

418. OECD, supra note 320, at 86-87.
419. Engel, Pagiola & Wunder, supra note 205, at 667.
420. Id.
421. Id. Salzman, however, points out to the potential danger of bid-rigging
through collusion when there are few providers. See Salzman, supra note 199, at 920.
422. Engel, Pagiola & Wunder, supra note 205, at 666.
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Watershed Agreement, the Australian based Bush Tender, and Costa Rican
program known as FONAFIFO.423
Additionally, there are still hybrid programs which are financed
primarily from governments funds but also include payments from service
users.424
Apart from user and government-financed schemes, some PES are
funded totally or partially by donors, at least in terms of the start up costs.
Start up costs include the costs of assessing the provisions of ecosystem
services and their values, designing the scheme, identifying prospective
buyers and sellers, and negotiating and closing the deal,425 and may
represent a substantial portion of the transaction costs. Donors are usually
NGOs, International Financial Institutions426 and private investors.427
Significant amounts of financial aid were given by these institutions for PES
in developing countries; however, that aid was not intended to be
permanent, but was rather meant to cover the costs of the transition to
improved practices.428
Although public payments can scale up more quickly and benefit from
economies of scale, they are believed to be less targeted, less efficient429 and
less sustainable than user-financed programs.430 Sustainability is a recurring
concern cited by some critics of PES, who argue that PES schemes are
unsustainable because they require ongoing financial commitments.431
However, the very reason payments were introduced was to compensate for
a positive externality because the activity of protecting or enhancing
ecosystem services was not rewarded by other means. As Ferraro and Kiss
point out, “like the legendary Holy Grail, however, the self-financing

423. Salzman, supra note 199, at 903.
424. Sven Wunder, Stefanie Engel and Stefano Pagiola, Taking Stock: A
Comparative Analysis of Payments for Environmental Services Programs in Developed and
Developing Countries, 65 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 834 (2008).
425. OECD, supra note 320, at 72; Ina Porras et al., supra note 341, at 39.
426. The Global Environmental Facility (GEF) biodiversity mainstreaming
portfolio includes more than thirty projects that apply PES. See OECD, supra note 32,
at 73.
427. Private investors have the alternative to buy green bonds issued by
governments, IFI, insurance companies, or private investment companies. See id., at
73-75.
428. Ina Porras et al., supra note 341, at 45.
429. Wunder, Engel and Pagiola, supra note 408.
430. OECD, supra note 320, at 76.
431. J. A. Swart, Will Direct Payments Help Biodiversity? 299 SCI. 1981 (2003), cited
in Wunder, Engel and Pagiola, supra note 408.
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conservation activity is elusive” and other policies adopted for conservation
also require a sustained flow of funds over time.432 Ideally, user-financed
programs are likely to provide reliable and sustainable PES financing, as far
as the ecosystem service is effectively delivered. However, due to the
limitations previously identified, mobilizing user finance is not always
possible. In such circumstances, leverage funds via taxes and fees can be
appropriate.433
f.

Potential Providers

Sellers can be private landowners, indigenous communities, protected
areas, land trusts, NGOs, and, in some circumstances, informal stewards or
whoever has de facto land use control over the targeted area.434 The unique
characteristics of watershed services compel negotiation with the landholder
located in the water supply area, and allow less flexibility in choosing
service providers. While many schemes compel de jure land rights, PES do
not necessarily require it, as long as the informal landowner whose claims
are widely recognized and respected has the “right to exclude” others.435 In
practice, however, insecure land tenure usually entails conflicts and weak
control over the parcel of land. This topic raises the issue of who should be
paid for the forgone opportunity cost. Wunder argues that for a PES scheme
to be politically acceptable a critical mass of decisionmakers must be
compensated.436 This critical mass may involve those who can make sitespecific claims over the area, communities acting as effective direct local
guardians, and local governments recently strengthened by decentralization
and oversight.437 At the end of the day, “[w]hom exactly to pay is a question
of negotiation, political feasibility, legality — and possibly also of ethics,
since some actors may lose illegal revenues, corrupt payoffs, and iniquitous
profits.”438
As the objective of PES is to protect or improve an ecosystem service
and the cost-effectiveness of the program recommends payments for those
who can provide greater additionality, “the ideal seller of environmental
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services is, if not outright environmentally nasty, then at least at the edge of
becoming so.”439
g. Cash vs. In kind
Payments can be made in cash or in kind. There are also programs
where training, technical assistance and other forms of capacity building
were transferred in addition to, or in some cases, instead of, financial
payments.440 In their survey, conducted in several developed and developing
countries, Wunder et al. found that all payments were based implicitly or
explicitly on the cost of service provision rather than on the value of the
service provided.441 Payments in cash are more appropriate when providers
lose cash from the foregone opportunity cost, although there is a debate
whether cash can effectively be used for poverty alleviation or whether it can
cause social distress.442 Based on a case study conducted in Bolivia
comparing in kind (beehives) and cash transfer, Wunder perceived
advantages and disadvantages to each model but concluded that the
beehive mode was more likely to support psychological studies which argue
that low-value in kind payments can be more effective than low-value cash
payments, because recipients are more likely to view in kind transfers as
compatible with reciprocal exchange and social markets.443 Nevertheless,
the author argues that the preferences and effectiveness vary among
individuals and communities and, therefore, a customized approach is
desirable.444
2. To Protect or Improve an Ecosystem Service
In theory, any payment related to the delivery of services identified in
the four groups described above in subsection “Freshwater Ecosystem
Services” can be transacted. In practice, due to the challenges in translating
ecosystem services into a commodity that can be the subject of a contract,
only four types of ecosystem services have been negotiated to date: carbon
sequestration, biodiversity protection, watershed protection and protection
of landscape beauty.445 For watershed protection, the goal is usually water
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quality, quantity or both.446 It is generally accepted that land-use
management practices can affect the provision of watershed services,
although there is disagreement as regards to extent and nature of the
effects.447 The agreements negotiated usually involve the adoption of
agricultural, forest and stream best management practices (BMPs), as well
as reforestation, conservation, and rehabilitation of existing ecosystems.448
The list of BMPs commonly adopted are buffers and setbacks, alternatives to
slash-and-burn, soil conservation techniques and grazing practices,
pesticides management, stream bank fencing to keep animals out of
waterways, and erosion-preventing forestry strategies, depending on
whether the riparian area is in a rural or an urban setting.449 Engel et al.,
point out that programs involving changes in land use, such as
reforestation, tend to be more expensive than programs that focus on
protecting existing land uses, such as preserving existing forests.450 It must
also be stressed that some land uses such as reforestation, which provide a
specific ecosystem service like carbon sequestration, might be harmful for
the delivery of other services such as biodiversity. The loss of biodiversity
might increase pest and diseases, requiring the use of pesticides which can
negatively impact waterbodies and soil.
As already mentioned, PES were introduced as a policy mechanism to
protect or enhance ecosystem services. However, since ecosystem services
are usually provided over the long term, and since much uncertainty remains
regarding the links between structures and functions, policy designers must
deduce what would hypothetically happen without the PES intervention.
The baseline is essentially the business-as-usual trend in ecosystem service
provision in the absence of the PES.451 As a result, the choice of the
appropriate baseline is crucial, because adopting the wrong baseline can
either lower the PES efficiency or result in a waste of money.452 In this
regard, three types of baseline can be adopted: a) Static Baseline, where the
service provision is assumed to remain constant without the payment

446. Ina Porras et al., supra note 341, at 29.
447. Id. at 7.
448. Id. at 34-37.
449. For a list of BMPs adopted in the United States to address storm-water
runoff in urbanized areas, EPA maintains a Web site with a national menu of BMPs.
See http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/stormwater/menuofbmps/ (Last visited on Dec. 16,
2010).
450. Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, supra note 205, at 667-668.
451. OECD, supra note 320, at 50.
452. Wunder, supra note 23, at 9.
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intervention; b) Declining Baseline, where the service provision is assumed to
decline over time, and any action to halt its deterioration is considered
additional; c) Improving Baseline, where the service provision is assumed to
improve over time even without specific interventions453. These types of
baselines can be visualized in the graphics below.
FIGURE 3:
Baseline Types*

In the case of PES, and PWS in particular, it is unlikely that policy
makers will adopt an improving baseline to establish and evaluate the
efficiency of the payment scheme, because the rate of biodiversity and

453.

Id. at 8-9.
Sven Wunder, PAYMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES: SOME NUTS AND BOLTS,
CIFOR OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 42, (2005) at 9, Figure 2.
*
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ecosystem degradation and loss are undeniable.454 The choice will fall
between a static and a deteriorating baseline, and must be based on a
context-specific analysis.
a. Additionality
As demonstrated in the figure above, additionality implies a greater
aggregate effect of an input into another existing input.455 The concept of
additionality in environmental policy was largely debated and explored as
one of the preconditions for Clean Development Mechanism Projects (“CDM
Projects”) — one of the flexible mechanisms established by the Kyoto
Protocol and also required in the voluntary carbon market.
b. Additionality in Carbon Offset Projects
Additionality is considered the most important and controversial
requirement in a carbon offset project and, to assess it, some tests were
developed. Under the Legal and Regulated Additionality Test, “if the project is
implemented to fulfill official policies, regulations, or industry standards, it
cannot be considered additional.”456 If other legal obligations would lead to
the reduction achieved in that particular project, then it fails the
additionality test. Under the Financial or Investment Test, “the revenue from the
carbon offsets must be a decisive reason for implementing a project.”457 In
other words, if the project’s rate of return is attractive enough without
considering the project, it is not additional. To pass the Common Practice Test,
the project must show that it does not employ technologies that are already
commonly used. Some standards still might require the Barrier Test, which
demands that the project must succeed in overcoming nonfinancial barriers
that the business-as-usual alternative would not have had to face, such as
local resistance or lack of know-how.458 Most of the controversy surrounding

454. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, supra note 2.
455. Additionality as defined by the Business Dictionary: Extent to which a
new input (action or item) adds to the existing inputs (instead of replacing any of
them) and results in a greater aggregate.
Additionality Definition, Business
Dictionary.com
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/additionality.html
(Last visited on Dec. 16, 2010).
456. Anja Kollmuss, Helge Zink, Clifford Polycarp, Making Sense of the Voluntary
Carbon Market: A Comparison of Carbon Offset Standards 15 (2008). Available online at
http://assets.panda.org/downloads/vcm_report_final.pdf, (Last visited on Dec. 16,
2010).
457. Id.
458. Id.
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additionality in CDM projects is due to the fear that if the projects are not
truly additional, and the credits generated by them will be used to offset
emissions somewhere else, then the aggregate effect will be higher GHG
emissions. The scenario is different for PWS, and new methodologies must
be developed to assess additionality.
Considering that the ultimate goal of PES is to obtain or improve
service provision, the targeted activity should be one that can provide
greater additionality over the baseline, in order to avoid expending money
for nothing, which would be inefficient.459 This efficiency, however, raises
issues of equity that are explored in below in subsection I. However, what
must certainly be avoided is to turn payments for ecosystem services into
perverse subsidies,460 thereby rewarding service providers for worsening the
services they provide in expectation of future payments and, therefore,
making PES unwittingly reward the very behavior they are trying to
suppress.461 Setting the appropriate baseline in a reasonable period prior to
the design of the program can help avoid this problem.462
c.

Leakage

Leakage refers to the inadvertent displacement of target damaging
activities to areas outside the geographical zone where the PES scheme is
being applied.463 The leakage of the damaging activity to an area outside the
project zone results in a nil or even negative protection and enhancement of
the service in the whole, which is the opposite of the policy goal. In
addition, it overestimates the environmental benefits that accrue from
PES.464 Ferraro and Kiss in their study of payments to conserve biodiversity
expressed concern over leakage in payment schemes although they also
stated that it is a problem that applies equally to more indirect approaches

459. Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, supra note 205, at 670.
460. Perverse subsidies are those that are detrimental to both the
environment and the economy in the long run. Some subsidies might be positive for
the first field and negative or neutral for the later and vice versa. See Norman Meyers
and Jennifer Kent, Perverse Subsidies: How Tax Dollars Can Undercut the Environment and the
Economy 22 (2001). Perverse subsidies can increase the profits of damaging activities
and increase the opportunity costs of activities that are alternative to the production
of ecosystem services. See OECD, supra note 320, at 48. A classical example would be
subsidies to develop agriculture and therefore, expand the local economy but
produce excessive and unsustainable water withdrawal and biodiversity loss.
461. Salzman, supra note 198, at 145; Wunder, supra note 286, at 57.
462. Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, supra note 205, at 668.
463. Id. at 670.
464. Id. at 671.
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to address conservation, such as ICDPs.465 Leakage is usually more a
concern for global projects such as carbon sequestration, and less a concern
in localized services like watershed services when the whole watershed is
included in the project.466
If leakage presents a potential risk in a project, the monitoring
framework can be extended to areas outside the geographic boundaries of
the PES scheme and some safeguard measures can be adopted, such as
penalties for land use changes implemented in areas within the community
but outside the project.467 These additional measures, however, might
increase the transaction costs, and must be weighed against the risks and
magnitude of the leakage.468
d. Permanence
Permanence refers to the ability of the scheme to ensure sustained
provision of the services over the long-term.469 Critics of PES argue that
once the payments have ceased, permanence will be hindered.470 However,
the very reason why payments were adopted is because the activity that
protects or enhances the ecosystem service has no incentive to be adopted
or maintained otherwise. Therefore, “there cannot be any expectation of
permanence in the absence of payments.”471 Permanence, therefore, should
be a concern when landholders purposely or negligently breach the
contract.472 To avoid this risk not only should payments cease but also
monetary penaltiesshould be established.
In this context, sometimes conditions change in a way that makes it
excessively burdensome for the service provider to maintain the original
agreement. In this regard, one of the main advantages of PES is that they
are flexible so the terms of the agreement can be renegotiated up to the
point that the scheme is still socially efficient.473 Another situation to look
out for is the loss of ecosystem services due to unforeseen events like fires,
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hurricanes, or introduction of invasive species.
The allocation of
responsibility must be clearly specified in the agreement, and when the risks
are particularly high, setting an emergency fund or underwriting an
insurance policy can be considered.474, 475
e. Targeting
Finally, it is crucial that the services to be protected and enhanced are
well identified and targeted especially when funds are insufficient to pay all
potential providers. Where funds for PES are limited payments for land uses
that would have been adopted anyway reduce funds available for PES
elsewhere.476 It might seem obvious but it is crucial to first identify which
ecosystem service shall be protected or enhanced in order to define which
sites and land management practices must be adopted or discouraged.
When looking for water quality, for instance, concerns over eutrophication
require nutrient uptake while concerns over turbidity require sediment
retention services.477
While some schemes make uniform payments on a per hectare basis
the efficiency and effectiveness of the program can be enhanced by targeted
and differentiated payments.478 Spatial mapping tools are being developed
to identify and discern the spatial heterogeneity in ecosystem services,
providing data to build environmental benefit indices and scores.479
Targeting can be based not only on the individual level and value of the
service being provided but also on the threats to which the service is
subject, or the lowest opportunity cost,480 allowing flexible payments
according to different individual values and costs.481 Some governmentfinanced programs also use poverty alleviation as a targeting criterion,

474. OECD, supra note 320, at 52; Forest Trends, supra note 387, at 12.
475. The Carbon Market spurred a variety of insurance products ranging from
carbon credit risk products to insurance for alternative energies. Driven by new
opportunities seem in the risk business, the insurance sector is likely to increase
their offer of products in this field.
476. Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, supra note 205, at 670.
477. Salzman, supra note 198, at 900.
478. OECD, supra note 320, at 58.
479. They are: the UNEP-WCMC Carbon and Biodiversity Demonstration Atlas,
Artificial Intelligence for Ecosystem Services (ARIES), Integrated Valuation of
Ecosystem Services and Trade-offs (InVEST), and SENSOR. See id. at 60.
480. Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, supra note 205, at 671.
481. Id.
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although PES was not originally designed for this end result.482 While
targeting payments based on level and type of service provision is likely to
be more effective (and efficient), determining the exact level of service
required and how much it should be rewarded is the greatest challenge, due
to the complexity of ecosystem services and the high transaction costs
thereto.483 Whereas this approach might improve efficiency, it must be
weighed against associated additional transaction costs.484
When faced with budget constraints, which is a common reality
everywhere, targeted PES may lead to making fewer payments, or no
payments at all, to those who have already provided or are providing the
targeted service. While some argue that it might be unfair, Wunder points
out that this is not always true, because those who do not constitute a
credible threat probably do not lose conservation opportunity costs from
foregone development.485
3. Conditional to the Delivery of the Service
As already mentioned, conditionality is the most controversial key
feature of PES. The complexity of ecosystem service dynamics, the lack of
knowledge and weak institutions render the conditionality as the weakest
condition to be demonstrated, and many schemes being negotiated are
based on beliefs rather than scientific proof. This problem is more acute in
PWS where the scientific evidence on the linkages between land use and the
delivery of watershed services is insufficiently strong.486 While the links
between land use and water quality find consensus in the literature and are
well documented, the links between land use and water quantity are more
difficult to demonstrate.487
Despite these challenges, “[c]onditionality is critical to the definition
of PES”488 and must be pursued.489 When the links between land use and
delivery of the service are well established it often should be possible to
design appropriate PES programs.490 As Wunder points out, “the less
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realistic the scientific basis of a PES scheme, the more exposed it is to the
risk of buyers questioning its rationale and abandoning payments.”491
Therefore, “user payments [and government payments as well] need to be
truly contingent upon the service being continuously provided.”492
a. Monitoring and Certification
For PES schemes to be conditional, it is critical to monitor them and
verify whether the service is being delivered. In other words, whether there
was “additionality” over the established baseline. In a survey that analyzed
several PES schemes in developed and developing countries, it was argued
that, in all cases, payments were at least nominally conditional. In small
user financed programs, conditionality was limited by monitoring capacity,
and in government-financed programs, conditionality was limited by
unwillingness to penalize noncompliance.493 Monitoring also enables
decisionmakers to adjust and improve the design of the program over time494
and enforce penalties whenever there is a breach of contract.495
Ideally PES should be made upon the services effectively delivered —
e.g., it should be output-based.496 The assessment can be based on detailed
and site-specific monitoring or “rough and ready” visual field estimates.
Whichever method is used it must take into account spatial variation and
landscape context.497 In practice, due the complexities of ecosystem services
and the time delay between the implementation of the land management
practice and the delivery of the services, PES are usually input based.498
Payments are made based on land-management practices believed to
deliver the service, measured on a per-hectare basis, on a number of trees
planted, on a quantity of invasive species cleared, or whatever is the practice
adopted.499 To evaluate additionality and discern the PES impact from
omitted variables such as recipients’ location, schooling, conservation
attitudes, etc., Wunder suggests combining implementation with research
and systematic data collection, randomly, in areas with performance
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payments and in areas where there is no payment.500 Also recommended is
assessing the socioeconomic impacts at the participant’s level, to ensure
that the welfare of participants is improved.501
For the conditionality to be effective many authors suggest that
payments should be made periodically and should not involve large
irreversible up-front benefits such as construction of infrastructure that are
more appropriate for ICDP projects.502 Periodicity is even more crucial where
governance is weak and monitoring is deficient.503

G. Legal Framework
“Payment for watershed service (PWS) schemes do not operate in a
legal, social or political vacuum.”504 Rather, they operate in the national and
local legal framework, which might either constrain or enhance the use of
this policy. In some circumstances, depending on the country and context, a
legislative change is required in order to establish a PES scheme.505
As will be demonstrated below in section H subsection 3, PES is
appropriate when threats to the delivery of ecosystem services constitute a
legal and legitimate activity. In this sense, the legal system and existing
regulations will shape the situations in which PES can be considered an
appropriate policy option and those situations where it is not. According to

500. Wunder, supra note 23, at 10.
501. OECD, supra note 320, at 49.
502. Wunder, supra note 23, at 16.
503. Id. at 4.
504. Asquith, Nigel et al., Global Experiences with Payments for Watershed Services:
Major Challenges and Solutions, Natura Bolivia/IIED/CIFOR (2008), cited in Forest Trends,
supra note 387, at 38.
505. In 1997, Brazil introduced a new statute regulating the national policy of
water resources — Law No. 9.433, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA União (1997). To create the
institutional arrangements necessary to implement the new policy, and start
charging fees for water use, another statute was enacted — Law No. 9.984, DIÁRIO
OFICIAL DA União (2000). Both are available online at http://www.senado.gov.br/
legislacao (Last visited on Dec. 16, 2010). These legislative changes set the stage for
the implementation of several pilot projects for watershed protection that are under
test in the country. See supra note 4. In 2007, a new bill, PL 792, was introduced in
Congress regulating specifically Payments for Ecosystem Services as a new policy.
The bill still has to be approved by the House of Representatives and the Senate
before it became federal law. See supra note 3).
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Salzman, despite few exceptions,506 the protection of ecosystem services by
the law was not a primary objective during the drafting of the major and
most relevant environmental laws in the United States.507 The Clean Water
Act does not directly regulate nonpoint source pollution, and this absence
makes the case for PES to be considered a cost-effective policy.508 The law
may also act as the major driver for the adopting of PWS (see the NYC
Watershed Agreement Case, above in section F subsection 3) through tough
regulation on environmental standards. Further, the law is crucial in
defining and enforcing land tenure which, in turn, is crucial for establishing
PES. To establish a PES scheme rights to the land that delivers the
environmental services, especially the right to exclude others, must be
clarified.509 J. Börner, analyzing PES applied in the Brazilian Amazon,
suggests that unclear or insufficient land tenure information in the area
limits the scope and application of a REDD scheme.510
In some circumstances, legislative changes are necessary in order to
make possible the establishment of the agreements and the transfer of
payments. The legislative change usually starts with the recognition of
ecosystem services in national or local environmental laws, although there
are reports of payment schemes that moved forward without any change.511
Nevertheless, it is recommended that legislative statutes contain the
necessary management structure, and procedural, monitoring and
enforcement provisions, to avoid setbacks when the government changes.512
Legal provisions can be inserted in the State Constitution, in public or civil
law, and “where legal and policy frameworks are lacking, contract law
becomes the framework within which PES develops.”513
Statutory requirements also make possible the charge of fees or taxes
from resource users and the reallocation of funds from the general budget.
This is the goal of a new law approved in Costa Rica in 2006 and it is

506. These exceptions are the Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, sections 4
and 9 of the Endangered Species Act and the National Forest Management Act’s use
of indicator species. See Salzman, supra note 198, at 880-81.
507. Id.
508. Ina Porras et al., supra note 341, FN 9 at 29; PL n. 792 of 2007. Available
online at http://www.camara.gov.br/sileg/integras/453221.pdf (Last visited on Dec.
12, 2010).
509. Arild Vatn, supra note 350, at 1247-1248.
510. Jan Börner et al., Direct Conservation Payments in the Brazilian Amazon: Scope
and Equity Implications, 69 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1272, 1281 (2010).
511. Ina Porras et al., supra note 341, at 48-50.
512. Id. at 50-51.
513. Forest Trends, supra note 387, at 38.
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expected that these funds will be channeled to PWS.514 The same
mechanism was used in Brazil when the Law 9.984 was enacted in 2000.
Overall, the law has the power to drive social norms and force
beneficiaries and decisionmakers to internalize the value of ecosystem
services in many ways.515 Despite the critical role the law plays in promoting
ecosystem services, it is the least developed component in the literature on
ecosystem services.516
Although the circumstances where the legal
framework may boost or restrain the use of payments schemes are country
specific, the law is certainly crucial for defining which services should be
rewarded, and helpful for the design and implementation of PES.

H. When PES is appropriate
1. When in Face of a Positive Externality
By its own definition, PES only makes sense when a positive
externality exists.517 Having said that the ultimate purpose of PES is to
obtain an improvement or conservation of ecosystem services where the
activity does not generate profits despite delivering valuable ecosystem
services, the ideal situation for implementing a PES is in a privately
unprofitable but socially valuable activity.518 In contrast, where the activity is
profitable but generates negative externalities then the best approach is
usually the levy of a tax or charge.519 In such circumstances when the
“polluter pays” principle can be clearly applied, a PES scheme should not be
used; instead, regulation or taxation should be used.520 When the activity is
profitable and socially valuable, PES can be combined with an ICDP-type
strategy for point-wise interventions.521
2. Opportunity Costs of Alternative Actions Are Equivalent or
Lower
If the approach is to offer a positive incentive, the service provider
must see a net benefit. For that reason, when high threats correlate to

514.
515.
516.
517.
518.
519.
520.
521.

Ina Porras et al., supra note 341, at 43.
Thompson, supra note 39, at 479-485.
Ruhl, Kraft and Lant, supra note 11, at 9.
Börner et al., supra note 495, at 1273.
Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, supra note 205, at 670.
Id.
Salzman, supra note 198, at 934.
Wunder, supra note 286, at 56.
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elevated opportunity costs, PES are not appropriate because either the
funds available cannot match the profitable alternate land use or the
payments required would make this policy extremely inefficient when
compared to other tools available. Conversely, PES are unlikely to be
effective in changing behaviors in activities where non-economic incentives
drive the behavior. Such incentives could include lack of credit, deficient
technology, infrastructure, know-how, etc.522 Opportunity costs can be
assessed using the so-called “costly to fake signals” format, meaning using
information correlated with the opportunity cost that are expensive or
difficult to fake.523
Overall, PES is most effective “at the margin of profitability, when
small payments to landowners can tip the balance in favor of the desired
land use” and “can really make a difference in the intermediate range of
positive but numerically small opportunity costs.”524 Some initiatives in the
NYC Watershed Agreement provide an example of payments insufficient to
match more profitable alternate land uses. Due to political pressure, an
initial plan to set a mandatory 200-foot setback from streams was turned
into a voluntary, financially rewarded initiative. However, since the payoffs
offered were lower than the opportunity costs of growing crops along the
most productive land, many farmers did not engage in the initiative.525
Although this rationale is quite straightforward, Wunder calls attention
to some complexities inherent in this analysis. When deciding which land
use to adopt, landowners are not exclusively driven by average profits but
might be influenced by other factors such as risk, price fluctuations,
expected future returns, legality of use, security of land tenure, and returns
per labor input or capital unit invested rather than land unit.526 In sum, PES
designers must be able to not only analyze opportunity costs of current land
uses, but also anticipate emerging threats and their future rising costs, as
accurately as possible, targeting PES to areas where they can really make a
difference.527
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3. Threats to Service Provision Are Legal and Legitimate
PES are usually appropriate when the activity that constitutes a threat
for the provision of ecosystem services is legal and buyers want performance
above current standards. In this case, a typical example is when technology
or performance based standards are in place to regulate air pollution, but
administrators decide to pay for superior performance.528 Where the activity
is mandatory or forbidden, it certainly must be enforced, at least, to not
allow opportunity for environmental blackmail or perverse incentives.529
There are other situations, however, where the activity that constitutes
a threat is not regulated because the link between this activity and the loss
of ecosystem services is not clear or cannot be easily individualized.
Identifying the locus of nonpoint source pollution and quantifying its
amount are examples of the challenges involved in regulation regarding
pollution, aggravated by the fact that some polluting runoff occurs
naturally.530 There are also situations where the local political and legal
institutions don’t favor the regulation of certain activities. A classic example
of legitimate activity that most often faces political opposition is the case of
nutrient runoff from farm activities, which poses a serious threat to water
quality and the whole aquatic ecosystem. Although one could imagine the
feasibility of imposing mandatory buffer vegetation,531 restricting the use of
pesticides and fertilizers, or installing riparian fences to prevent animal
manure from flowing into the watercourse, these options are easier said
than done. The problem related to non-point source pollution — where
nutrient runoff is one of the examples — exposes the difficulties in
regulating scattered sources, demonstrating the relationship between the
activity and the ecosystem service degradation and the intricacies in coping

528. Salzman, supra note 199, at 143.
529. There are examples of PES for forest conservation where deforestation is
illegal on grounds of weak or nonexistent enforcement.
530. Miller, Powers and Elder, supra note 184, at 799.
531. In Brazil, although there is mandatory buffer zone, Law No. 4.471, 1965,
Diário Oficial da União [D.O.U.] (Braz.), landholders are not required to restore areas
already degraded, where perpetrators cannot be identified or the statute of
limitations for liability applies. In such situations, there are opportunities for the use
of PES. Available at http://www.senado.gov.br/legislacao (last visited Sept. 10, 2011).
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with political pressure.532 In such circumstances, the use of persuasion and
payments might be the only real arrow left in the policy quiver.533
4. Other Policies Fail to Secure Ecosystem Service Provision
The reasons why other policies fail to secure ecosystem service
provision are varied and site-specific, but those commonly cited in the
literature are summarized below.
Ecosystem services geography usually does not match political
boundaries.534 In a watershed protection scheme, it is not unusual that a
watershed crosses several municipalities or even surpasses state borders. In
the United States, local zoning is the rule and comprehensive land use
planning is the exception.535 Therefore, administrators lack authority to
regulate and enforce activities in areas outside their political jurisdiction.
Even when environmental managers have the authority to tax or
regulate, these mechanisms can fail either because institutions are weak or
absent, because they face strong political opposition, or because they
perform less efficiently when compared to payment schemes. In some
developing countries where institutions are weak and regulation is weakly
enforced, there are examples of payments for forest conservation where
deforestation is illegal.536 In these cases, logic would recommend that
command and control regulations simply be enforced, and that penalties be
imposed on violators — however, the reality is that there is no enforcement
or it is too weak.537 Faced with such a situation, one wonders how PES could
be effective and efficient in the absence of monitoring and enforcement.
Some authors argue that where regulation is weakly enforced, it is easier to
secure cooperation from land users when offering carrots rather them
threatening them with sticks.538 In addition, by raising the value of
conserved resources, PES can raise the local communities’ incentives to

532. In the United States, the difficulties in regulating nonpoint sources are
more related to political opposition than to scientific limitations. See Salzman, supra
note 198, at 929.
533. Id. at 912-14. Salzman describes the situation faced by the Sydney
Catchment Authority in Australia, dealing with eutrophication in the Wingecarribee
Reservoir.
534. See supra note 8.
535. Plater, supra note 135, at 1217.
536. Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, supra note 205 at 669.
537. Wunder, supra note 286, at 49.
538. Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, supra note 205, at 669.
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self-enforce existing regulations, thereby helping to overcome the lack of
state enforcement.539
There are also cases where regulation faces strong political opposition.
The agricultural lobbies in many countries have historically been successful
in opposing any initiative that restricts the use of agricultural land or
imposes higher costs for environmental protection.540, 541, 542 Salzman draws a
parallel with nonbinding international law and argues that when regulators
are unable to regulate because there is no authority or the rule is not
enforced for political reasons, the “beneficiary pays” principle rather than
the “polluter pays” principle is more likely to succeed.543
Finally, the use of PES presupposes that this policy shall be more cost
effective than other mechanisms available. “PES efficiency is not only
determined by the extent to which incremental ES are provided, but also by
the cost at which this was achieved.”544 Prescriptive regulation must address
the broadest number of situations in the regulated community,
notwithstanding whether the number of land management practices that
really make a difference in service provision tends to be much smaller. This
is an example of the “80/20 rule” i.e., where eighty percent of the effects
come from twenty percent of the regulated community.545 As a result,
prescriptive regulation tends to be overinclusive and more likely to be
inefficient when compared to targeted PES, especially for discrete service
provision.546 From another standpoint, to set the appropriate level of
regulation or the price to be borne by the undesirable activity governments
need to gather information, and this process is usually costly lengthy, and
ineffective. According to the United Nations World Water Development

539. Id.
540. Salzman, supra note 198, at 929.
541. If the agricultural lobby is too powerful to be defeated (assuming they
were not challenged before the WTO), Professor Salzman presents a pragmatic
solution that has been debated in the United States. Instead of going to subsidize
the production of agricultural goods, these funds could be channelled to the
provision of ecosystem services. See Salzman, supra note 199, at 150.
542. In Brazil, there is a recent move orchestrated by the agricultural coalition
to change the Brazilian Forest Code, reducing the mandatory riparian buffer zone,
among other things. Richard Blaustein and Chris Santiago, Will Brazil Change its Forest
Code – and Kill the Amazon Rainforest? (2010) http://news.mongabay.com/2010/0922ecosystem_marketplace_forest_cost.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2011).
543. Salzman, supra note 198, at 927-28.
544. Wunder, Engel and Pagiola, supra note 408, at 847.
545. Salzman, supra note 198, at 922.
546. Id. at 923-924.
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Report 3, the charges levied on polluters had only a slight impact on
behavior, because such charges are rarely set high enough.547 The most
efficient way to gather this information is in a PES scheme where providers
know their properties and opportunity costs and can express which services
they can provide and at which cost.548 Governments, in turn, know which
type of land use changes they are seeking and their willingness to pay for
this.549 As a result, information exchange in a PES scheme is more efficient
than in a regulatory approach where the information exchange is usually a
one-way discussion and information on the less costly land-use alternatives
is missed.550 Salzman argues that PES is more attractive than regulation or
taxation when faced with high information costs.551 When information costs
are low, so are the savings from such a policy, so it is not worth the potential
problems of PES such as moral hazards and rent seeking.552 This dynamic of
information cost exchange might well be true in PES schemes introduced in
Australia553 or even in the United States, but it is not the reality in many
developing countries where insufficient skills, information asymmetry and
weak institutions are commonplace.554 As a result, Wunder recommends
that the adoption of a PES should be preceded by a realistic assessment of
how efficiently other tools could work.555 A general conclusion that might be
applied to both developed and developing countries is that practices which
are privately profitable but which generate negative externalities or do not
add value in terms of environmental services are best addressed by taxes
and fees.556 Salzman reaches the same conclusion when he states “it does
seem harder to argue that society should demand generation of positive
externalities without payment.”557
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5. When the Services Are Threatened But Not Yet Lost and
Decisions Are on the Edge
When targeting PES, buyers should focus not only on areas with
current threats, but also on areas with projected threats because sometimes
threats are only unambiguously revealed when it is too late.558 PES buyers,
either government or users, essentially compete with other opportunity
costs. As a result, it is perceived that PES schemes have a higher
effectiveness when the scarcity of a particular ecosystem service is perceived
but the service has not yet been lost and decisions are still “on the edge.”559
Using as an example a conservation project in Indonesia where the local
community was suffering pressure to sell their logging rights, Wunder argues
that, “once the balance has tipped and the community has sold off logging
rights, it is obviously too late for PES to have any impact.”560
6. When Property Rights Are Clearly Defined and Enforced
While some authors argue that PES may contribute to the
formalization of property rights,561 the vast majority argue that they are
appropriate when land owners providing ecosystem services effectively have
the right to exclude other uses,562 and this right to exclude usually demands
formal land tenure. Land managers do not always have formal land tenure,
particularly in the tropics,563 and this situation puts them in a weak situation
in terms of excluding others. Although scholars don’t attach formal land
tenure as an essential element of payment schemes, the reality indicates
that unless informal landowners can effectively control access and exclude
others for using the land, the service in that particular area should not be
subject to a PES agreement.564
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Forest Trends, supra note 387, at 10.
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I.

Potentials and Caveats
1. Implements the Precautionary and Intergenerational
Equity Principles

By assessing current and future threats, PES aims to change behaviors
when the services are threatened but not lost and decisions are on the
edge.565 Therefore, by preventing future environmental degradation PES
provides an insurance against future degradation,566 to the benefit of future
generations. As a result, PES implements both the precautionary567 and
intergenerational equity principles.568 In addition, it offers a more costeffective solution in terms of conservation, since protecting ecosystems is
usually cheaper than restoring them with funds from taxes or fines,
assuming such restoration is even feasible.569 As the State of Watershed
Payments Report points out, the city of Santa Fe is the first in the United
States to use payments for ecosystem services as an insurance against
future threats to the water supply.570 The Santa Fe Municipal Watershed
Plan 2010-2029 also stresses that “it is unique in that it seeks to fund forest
restoration activities using the Payment for Ecosystem Services model as an
insurance policy against future threats, particularly that of catastrophic fire,
to the municipal water supply.”571

565. Wunder, supra note 23, at 12.
566. Wunder, supra note 286, at 54, 56.
567. The Precautionary Principle is stated in Principle 15 of the Rio
Declaration as “In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach
shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be
used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation.” United Nations, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 3
- 14 June 1992, available at http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp
?documentid=78&articleid=1163 (last visited Sept. 10, 2011).
568. The intergenerational equity principle was mentioned in principles 1 and
2 of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment (1972) and stated in
principle 3 of the Rio Declaration as “[t]he right to development must be fulfilled so
as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future
generations.” Id.
569. Wunder, Engel and Pagiola, supra note 408, at 844.
570. Stanton et al., supra note 247, at 46.
571. Tori Derr et al., The Santa Fe Municipal Watershed Plan 2010-2029 (2009),
http://www.santafenm.gov/DocumentView.aspx?DID=4354 (last visited Sept. 10,
2011).
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2. Transitional Instrument
As already indicated, the law plays a crucial role in defining which
practices should be rewarded with payments and which should not. The law
clearly changes and influences behaviors, but this process might face strong
opposition. Whenever there is political will to raise the duty of care over
environmental protection and either drive landholders to internalize the
costs or make taxpayers internalize the costs, PES can act as a bridge.572 In
such circumstances, if the agency has a credible stick to be used soon, PES
“act as ‘circuit breakers,’ easing the internalization of and transition to a
higher duty of care.”573 J. B. Ruhl compares such payments to a “legislated
extension of the constitutional backstop of regulatory takings law, providing
compensation to the otherwise disadvantaged interests in order to
ameliorate their economic losses and remove their opposition to the policy
change.”574 Such an approach evidently assumes that regulation or taxation
would be feasible and cost-effective, but not adopted for political
opposition.
3. Improve the Livelihood of the Poor
Since the rationality behind PES schemes is to offer a positive
incentive for landholders to change environmentally damaging land uses,
this increased source of income can, in theory, improve the livelihood of the
local community when the landholders are poor.575 However, the policy
initially was not conceptualized as a mechanism for poverty alleviation;
rather, it was conceived as a policy to improve ecosystem service
provision.576 Indeed, since the goal is to protect or enhance service
provision, thereby targeting the poor — rather than the provider — with
greater additionality, it may come at the detriment of the environmental
policy goal.577 Even though poverty alleviation is a desired side effect, it
should not be the primary objective, otherwise PES might be “subsumed
into the generic family of altruistic development projects to which they were

572. Salzman, supra note 198, at 949-952.
573. Id. at 951.
574. Ruhl, Kraft and Lant, supra note 11, at 263.
575. Although PES are usually small, they can be relatively important when
few alternative cash sources exist. See Wunder, Engel and Pagiola, supra note 408,
at 850.
576. Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, supra note 205, at 671-72.
577. Wunder, Engel and Pagiola, supra note 408, at 850-51.
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actually meant to be an alternative.”578 Despite this theory, in all
government financed PES examined by Wunder, Engel and Pagiola, there
was at least one additional goal, other than ecosystem service provision,
and the most common goal was poverty alleviation.579 PES is also believed
to increase the “social capital” of the poor by improving social organization
and disseminating knowledge on sustainable resource practices.580
Despite these advantages, the poor face some structural constraints
when it comes to participating in PES schemes. The very poor usually lack
property rights over the parcels of land that provide ecosystem services and,
therefore, would be barred from participation, unless they had effective de
facto control over the area.581 Additionally, this parcel of land usually
provides the means for their livelihood and the adoption of a use restricting
PES scheme might cut this informal sector income 582 Furthermore, if high
transaction costs are a limitation for general PES participation, they
constitute a greater obstacle for the poor.583 When payments are transferred
through markets, constraints increase. Poor people usually possess
inadequate skills, education and information, which reflects in a power
asymmetry to their disservice.584 In addition, regulatory institutions in many
developing countries tend to be weak, which tends to increase transaction
costs and render information and information systems inadequate.585 The
implications of transaction costs are addressed in the next topic, but some
authors suggest that, in the face of these circumstances, simpler payment
schemes are likely to be most effective.586
With these caveats, it might be argued that PES schemes, when well
administered and continuously funded, offer an additional source of income
for the poor that are often more stable than other alternative sources,
particularly in disadvantaged regions.587 In the cases analyzed by Wunder,
Engel and Pagiola, poor people were able to access the program and
become service providers, although the data is insufficient to assess to what
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degree they effectively benefited from them.588 Although perhaps it is not
yet clear whether PES can make the poor better off, at the very least it is
clear that PES will not make them worse off.
Concerns were raised as to whether these schemes could constitute a
“PES trap,” where service providers are surprised by underestimated or
changing opportunity costs and find it burdensome to maintain the
agreement.589 Although buyers are usually in a better negotiation position,
for the sustainability of the agreement it is crucial that the sellers have a
good comprehension of the implication of the contract, which can be
provided by organizations working on the agreement.590 It is also highly
recommended that a renegotiation or exit clause be included, so that the
service providers can pull out or renegotiate the terms if changing
conditions induce them to do so.591
4. High Transaction Costs
Although transaction costs are site and service specific and depend on
several variables, some general conclusions can be drawn. Governmentfinanced PES tends to be more cost-effective than user-financed PES,
because of economies of scale in transaction costs.592 These economies of
scale, however, might be achieved at the cost of lower ecosystem service
values. “In general, transaction costs are highest when many smallholders
and multiple PES actors are involved, when institutions and property rights
are weak, and when costs of getting baseline information and of monitoring
land use and service provision are high.”593 These constraints largely affect
the poor, small landholders who usually do not control (or have weak) land
tenure.594 “Start up costs tends to be more prohibitive than running costs
especially for pilot schemes.”595 In addition, payments for ecosystem
services do not overcome the additional cost of regulation,596 but rather
might have to incorporate it. At the same time, only part of the high startup transaction costs is truly specific to PES, such as the costs to negotiate
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and close the agreement.597 Most of the costs involved to assess potential
service provisions, their values, and enforcement are also inherent to other
policies, such as command and control or taxes.598
To bundle small landholders and achieve economies of scale some
creative schemes have been tested599 such as bubble projects for carbon
sequestration,600 but at the cost of lower service delivery targeting and
additionality.601 With few exceptions bundling and layering ecosystem
services have remained an unattainable goal because such services face the
same sort of constraints that single schemes face, but to a greater degree.602
Nevertheless, research conducted in Guatemala concluded (with several
caveats) that when areas of interest for biodiversity conservation overlap
with areas of potential watershed services, PES can make a significant
contribution for biodiversity services.603
5. Negatively Impacts Social Norms in Conservation
An oft-cited concern is that commercial conservation might erode
culturally rooted, not-for-profit conservation values.604 Scholars who studied
several payment schemes argue that PES may undermine intrinsic
motivations for conservation and debilitate preexisting social markets.605
There is also a concern that government financed PES send the message
that environmental stewardship is a duty of governments rather than
individuals and this discourages initiatives made without profit purposes.606
Although the Leopoldian land ethic607 is a desirable goal, it is not clear
whether and how PES could be more harmful to the development of social

597. Wunder, Engel and Pagiola, supra note 408, at 849.
598. Id.
599. For a comprehensive list of proposed institutional innovations to reduce
transaction costs, see Forest Trends, supra note 387 at 45.
600. Wunder, supra note 23, at 17.
601. Wunder, supra note 286, at 53.
602. Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, supra note 205, at 667.
603. Stefano Pagiola et al., Can Payments for Watershed Services Help Finance
Biodiversity Conservation? A Spatial Analysis of Highland Guatemala, 2:1 J. OF NAT. RESOURCES
POL’Y RES. 7, 20 (2010).
604. Salzman, supra note 198, at 946-47.
605. Wunder, supra note 23, at 14-15.
606. Salzman, supra note 198, at 946-47.
607. An allusion to the American conservationist Aldo Leopold, see Salzman,
supra note 198, at 946.
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norms on conservation than are other existing policy tools.608 In any
circumstance, however, “PES implementation should be preceded by an
efficient analysis of existing approaches and motivation for ecosystem
services.”609
6. Hold Out, Moral Hazards, and Perverse Incentives
Depending on the service and the land context, the refusal of one
landowner to participate in the scheme may frustrate the effective delivery of
the ecosystem service.610 As long as the reasons for not participating are
related to higher opportunity costs or some others constraints previously
related, the problem is less a concern of policy design and more one of a
wrong policy choice. What makes policy designers frown, however, is the
risk of deliberate holdout and collusion with the purpose of raising the price
of payments. The holdout problem is more a concern regarding biodiversity
than regarding water quality because the effectiveness of achieving
watershed protection is less likely to be threatened by the actions of a few
landowners.611 Nevertheless, it is an issue that deserves attention and
Professor James Salzman states that it is unlikely to happen when the
reverse auction is competitive and there is selective information disclosure
on service score to the sellers.612
According to Wunder, the ideal environmental service seller is a
potentially environmentally nasty.613 Under this circumstances, how to avoid
a problem of “moral hazard?”614 How to avoid the creation of perverse
subsidies and achieve the policy goal at the same time?
While targeting ecosystem services based solely on efficiency may
raise a problem of moral hazard, Professor Salzman argues that “neither
subsidies nor markets are based on equity.”615 In contrast, non-Coasean
proponents argue that efficiency and equity are usually intertwined, and that
the choice of the fairness criterion may be critical for determining this

608. Salzman, supra note 198, at 947.
609. Wunder, supra note 23, at 14.
610. Salzman, supra note 198, at 939-940.
611. Id. at 940.
612. Id.
613. Sven Wunder, Environmental Services: Some Nuts and Bolts, CIFOR OCCASIONAL
PAPER NO. 42 (2005) at 12.
614. Id. at 942-43.
615. Salzman, supra note 199, at 144.
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interdependency and the PES outcomes.616 If equity cannot be ignored in a
PES design, how it should be weighed against efficiency deserves further
investigation.617
Although it is generally agreed that it is essential to remove perverse
subsidies for PES (or any other policy) effectiveness,618 here the concern is
slightly different. What must be avoided is the creation of perverse
incentives that are induced by payment schemes, a situation where
landowners would deliberately delay improving land management practices,
or even worsen them in expectation of future payments.619 While the
criticism that subsidies might end up rewarding the behavior they are
aiming to suppress is not without reason, this is less of a concern in
payment schemes620 because the sums are usually small and the costs for
restoring an ecosystem deliberately degraded are probably not recoverable
by payments.621 Nevertheless, to avoid such type of environmental
blackmail, setting the baseline in a reasonable period prior to the design
and implementation of the scheme might be a helpful safeguard measure.622
Since PES contains many elements of subsidization it is helpful and
advisable to learn from the comments and recommendations made by the
Council on Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle to EOCD
countries. The Council states that the conditions under which governmental
aid, including subsidies, are acceptable and are considered not to infringe
the Polluter-Pays Principle623 are: i) not turning the subsidy into a perverse
subsidy, ii) clearly framing the policy goal and iii) adequately targeting the
ecosystem service payments. It can also be argued that “uncontroversial
subsidies are those where the positive spillovers generated by the supported
activities contribute to clearly identifiable public goods.”624

616. Unai Pascual et al., Exploring the Links Between Equity and Efficiency in
Payments for Environmental Services: A Conceptual Approach, 69 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1237
(2010).
617. Id. at 1243.
618. OECD, supra note 320, at 48.
619. Salzman, supra note 198, at 944-45.
620. Id. at 945.
621. Id. at 946.
622. Engel, Pagiola and Wunder, supra note 205 at 668.
623. OECD Recommendation C (74) 223.
624. Keppler, supra note 209, at 193.
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IV. Conclusion
Biodiversity and freshwater ecosystems provide a range of invaluable
services to our society. Drinking water is essential for the survival of all
living organisms. Photosynthesis, which provides primary production and
supports the entire food chain, would not occur without water. For these
most basic needs there is no substitute. Freshwater ecosystems and the
services they provide made possible the incredible economic development
achieved in the past centuries. These services are required for food (rain fed
or irrigation systems) and energy production. They are also needed in the
industrial sector. Aquatic ecosystems sustain fisheries and provide raw
material for pharmaceutical products and bioengineering. They still provide
nonmaterial benefits, such as cultural, artistic, spiritual, recreational and
aesthetic services. To deliver all these services that are critical for life
support, welfare and economic growth, nature depends upon having water
as well as functioning ecosystems. Once natural ecosystem needs are met,
freshwater ecosystems provide a wide variety of regulating and supporting
services ranging from regulation of hydrological flow to wildlife habitat.
Despite the significant social, economic and cultural value provided by
healthy freshwater ecosystems, they have been dramatically altered in the
past fifty years (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment).625 The natural capital
that supports all these functions, processes and benefits have ecological
limits that, once exceeded, lead to a diminution and eventually loss of
ecosystem services. The indirect drives of change identified by the
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment are economic development and
population growth.626 The major identified direct drivers of change for
freshwater ecosystems are water diversion, pollution (especially from
nutrient loading), and invasive species, followed by land use changes and
unsustainable withdrawals.627 When considered in terms of a global
perspective, the existing amount of renewable freshwater is able to sustain
human as wells as ecosystem needs. However, as modern societies
withdraw, divert, pollute or otherwise impair freshwater ecosystems, they
limit the quantity and the capacity of these ecosystems to provide the
services upon which we all depend.
Notwithstanding several scientific publications that drew the attention
of the general public to the importance of ecosystem services for lifesupport and welfare, the task of incorporating these values into decision-

625.
626.
627.

ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING, supra note 2 at 31-32.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 332.
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making processes remains unaddressed. To tackle ecosystem degradation
and loss, policy makers have a variety of tools; the application of such
mechanisms, however, is shaped by some challenges. The characteristic of
public goods displayed by most ecosystem services is a challenge already
known and tested in several policies. This characteristic results in overconsumption or underproduction, because there are no mechanisms to
restrict the use and reward the production, causing a so called “externality.”
The new challenges related to ecosystem services are their inherent
complexity and our partial knowledge regarding the links between structures
and functions. Another complication is the lack of a price mechanism to
signal the scarcity or degradation of these services. Since such services do
not have a market value, economists have developed alternative
mechanisms to estimate such economic value. As seen above, this is not a
simple task, since it is affected by the complexity of the subject being
evaluated; it also involves ethical considerations and implies some tradeoffs.
Among the toolkit of policies for environmental protection, PES
emerged as an instrument designed to internalize positive externalities.
Justified under the “beneficiary pays” principle, rather than the “polluter
pays” principle, this policy provides a positive incentive to ensure the
provision of ecosystem services, conditional to their delivery. Initially
perceived as a market-based mechanism, it ultimately received a distinct
and unique place in the policy toolbox, as several diverse schemes were
tested in both developed and developing countries. Received by some as a
win-win solution to promote both conservation and sustainable use of
natural resources, it is, instead, a policy that recognizes hard trade-offs and
is appropriate for a limited set of conditions. PES has gained momentum
not because it is a catchphrase, but because there is a real need for better
ecosystem service management.
To deliver their promises, PES schemes must address three minimum
elements: the approach must use a positive incentive to drive the intended
behavior, transferred to the service providers as cash, in-kind or both. This
positive incentive must be offered conditionally to the return of an ecosystem
service provision. The service provision is delivered by actions (usually land
use practices) to protect or enhance an ecosystem service. Subsumed within these
three elements, a set of factors must be in place for this policy to be costeffective. The service provision must be in addition to a preestablished
baseline, and the scheme must contain mechanisms to avoid leakage and
ensure permanence. The design of the scheme must also contain provisions
for monitoring, reporting, and safeguarding against holdouts and perverse
incentives. Although many payments are made on a uniform basis, it is well
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recognized that targeting payments according to different values and costs
provides the greatest cost-effectiveness. This approach, however, may raise
the transaction costs and pose problems of equity. Since efficiency and
equity are usually intertwined, the relationship between them must still be
better explored.
Adopting this framework, PES is an appropriate policy when policy
makers are faced with a positive externality, since negative externalities are
best addressed by taxes or regulation. For this approach to be seen as a real
positive incentive by service providers, the “carrot” offered must at least be
equivalent to alternative opportunity costs. In other words, when the funds
available do not match the profits of alternative land practices, it is unlikely
that service providers will engage, and the proposal of such a policy might
be a waste of resources. This policy should only be applied when the
activity which represents a threat to the service provision is legal and
policymakers seek performance above current standards; otherwise, the
solution is just enforcement of current regulations.628 The use of PES is also
widely justified in situations where other policies have failed. The reasons
for the failure of other policies can be credited to the lack of authority to tax
or regulate, weak or inexistent institutions, strong political opposition to a
legislative change, or inefficiency of those policies because the information
gathering process necessary to tax or regulate is too costly or unjustified for
discrete service provision. Finally, PES is defensible when service providers
have the right to effectively exclude others from land use. Although it might
be achieved when land holders have de facto, rather than de jure control over
the lot of land, the right to exclude usually entails formal land tenure. For
all these characteristics, PES makes sense when service provisions are
threatened but not yet lost and decisions are on the edge.629 As a result, the
design of the program must include the assessment of areas under
forecasted threat.
Having said that, it seems that PES is a valuable policy tool that
implements both the precautionary and intergenerational equity principles,
because it aims to anticipate and alter actions that would result in
ecosystem service loss. By doing so, it not only avoids predictable and
unpredictable changes and losses resulting from land use changes, but also
provides insurance against future degradation, to the benefit of future

628. Nevertheless there are reports of payments made to avoid illegal
activities, justified under context of specific grounds that might not replicate.
629. Sven Wunder, Environmental Services: Some Nuts and Bolts, CIFOR OCCASIONAL
PAPER NO. 42 (2005) at 12.
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generations. It is also economically sound, because protecting ecosystems
is usually cheaper than restoring them with funds from taxes or fines.
Despite these potentials, PES still presents some doubts and
challenges to be addressed. It is not yet clear whether this policy improves
the livelihood of the poor. Although it was not designed as a poverty
alleviation policy, it certainly cannot make the poor worse off. In addition,
PES applied in developing countries usually involves concerns over equity
that cannot be ignored. The more effective the program in delivering service
provisions, the higher the transaction costs are likely to be. Nevertheless, it
must be pointed out that many of these transaction costs are inherent to
any other considered policy. High transaction costs dwarf the efficiency of
the policy and represent a strong limitation concerning the participation of
the poor. Careful consideration must be given during the assessment and
design of the program, so as not to undermine intrinsic motivations for
ecosystem protection and not allow the formation of perverse incentives.
Overall, PES must be applied strategically, filling the gaps where other
policies fail to deliver ecosystem provisions in a cost-effective manner. It is
certainly limited in scope, and the challenges from translating theory to field
remain but the promises are rewarding. Considering the role played by the
law to either boost or restrains the application and effectiveness of payment
schemes, this topic deserves further analysis, given that it is the least
developed component in the ecosystem services’ literature.630 This paper
has aimed to provide useful information for policy makers seeking to design
and implement payment schemes.
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